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A Big Picture Approach to Presidential
Influence on Agency Policy-Making
Mark Seidenfeld*
INTRODUCTION

Since President Nixon created the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) 1 and authorized that office to review regulations of the newly
created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),2 there has been a lively
debate about the appropriate level of presidential influence on the agency
policy-making function. s Even though environmentalists charged that
OMB had usurped the EPA's policy-setting role by vetoing EPA proposed
rules,4 some commentators called for a general increase in presidential
oversight over agency policy-setting The debate reached new heights after
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, 6 which provided for
OMB review of major rules proposed by all executive agencies, ostensibly
to ensure that they were cost-justified. Some have heralded this Order, in
large part for the political accountability they believed it brought to the
agency policy-making process. Others, however, have criticized it, often on

* Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to thank Rob
Atkinson for his help in developing and clarifying the ideas in this Article, Dan Farber, Dan
Gifford, and Jim Rossi for their thought provoking comments on previous drafts, and my
colleagues at the FSU College of Law for feedback they provided during a faculty workshop. I
am also grateful for the dedicated work provided by my research assistant Tammi Berden.
1. Nixon's Reorganization Plan created OMB out of the Bureau of the Budget. Reorg.
Plan No. 2 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 7959 (1970), rerinted in 84 Stat. 2085. The plan became
effective on July 1, 1970.
2. See Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991, at 127, 133-34.
3. For an overview of the major positions in the debate, see generally A Symposium on
Administrative Law "The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies"--Part
1I: Presidential Oversight of Regulatory Decisionmaking, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 443 (1987);
Symposium: Presidential Intervention in Administrative Rulemaking, 56 Tul. L Rev. 811
(1982).
4. Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: Hearings on S. 641
Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1972) (statement of Richard Ayres, Dir., Project on Clean Air, Natural
Resources Defense Council).
5. See, e.g., Comm'n on Law and the Economy, ABA, Federal Regulation: Roads to
Reform 79-80 (1979) [hereinafter Roads to Reform]; Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson,
Regulation and the Political Process, 84 Yale UJ. 1395, 1410-11 (1975); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 469,
520-24 (1985).
6. 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
7. See, ag., Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
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grounds that OMB regulatory review occurs behind closed doors and lacks
some of the procedural checks inherent in agency rulemaking 8 The
debate is likely to continue because President Clinton recently modified
OMB regulatory review, expanding its scope in some ways and limiting
OMB's prerogatives in others.9
As is true of any difficult controversy, there is merit to both sides of
the debate. The strongest claims in favor of White House regulatory review
stem from agencies' lack of coordination and direct political accountability.10 Proponents of greater presidential oversight argue that only the
President answers to the entire electorate rather than a particular
constituency. Hence, only he can be held responsible for the overall effect
of any regulatory policy." Moreover, because of the President's universal
jurisdiction over all regulatory matters, he can provide a generalist's
perspective to counteract parochial views that particular agencies may
type of problem and
develop from repeatedly regulating a single
12
interacting with a small set of interest groups.
Arguments against increased presidential influence of agency policymaking implicitly reflect a concern about consolidating too much power in

Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075, 1081 (1986); Peter Shane, Presidential Regulatory
Oversight and the Separation of Powers: The Constitutionality of Executive Order No 12,291,
23 Ariz. L Rev. 1235, 1263-64 (1981); see also Pierce, supra note 5, at 520-24 (arguing
generally for increased presidential influence over agency decision-making as a means of
increasing political accountability).
8. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Decisionmaking, 36 Am.
U. L. Rev. 443, 457 (1987); see also, Yvette M. Barksdale, The Presidency and Administrative
Value Selection, 42 Am. U. L Rev. 273, 310 (1993); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with
Agency Rulemaking- The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L Rev. 1059, 1064
(1986); Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control Of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of
Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 Ariz. L Rev. 1199,

1200 (1981).
9. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993). The debate is likely to continue
because recent Presidents have felt a need to overcome bureaucratic unresponsiveness,
political opposition, inadequate knowledge, and time constraints in reaction to public
demands that they solve the country's problems. Because public expectations often exceed the
President's ability to perform, modem Presidents have tried to increase their ability to dictate
regulation by creating more politicized and centralized institutions to exert control over
bureaucratic decisionmaking. See Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in The Managerial
President 135, 156 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 1991); Richard W. Waterman, Presidential Influence
and the Administrative State 9-10 (1989); see also Richard P. Nathan, The Administrative
Presidency 3-12 (1983) (describing the tendency of all Presidents since Franklin Roosevelt to
try to control the administrative state and labeling this approach to governing the
"administrative presidency").
10, Percival, supra note 2, at 179; Peter L Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the
President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 181, 187 (1986).
11. See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J.
451, 455 (1979); Cutler & Johnson, supra note 5, at 1405-06; McGarity, supra note 8, at 452;
Richard Pierce, Political Accountability and Delegated Power A Response to Professor Lowi,
36 Am.U. L. Rev. 391, 408 (1987).
12, See Cutler &Johnson, supra note 5, at 1405-06; DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 7, at
1081; McGarity, supra note 8, at 452.

PRESIDENTIAL .INFLUENCE
a single branch of government 5 Advocates of limits on presidential
control stress that such control may allow the President to undermine
Congress's statutory policy. 14 They note that OMB review circumvents the
1
relatively open processes by which agencies make rules under the APA. '
Thus, they fear presidential influence will translate into back-room dealpolicy. 16
making that will undercut the political accountability of agency
Rather than directly entering the fray in the debate on whether more
or less presidential influence over agency policy-making is appropriate, this
Article approaches the question along another dimension by analyzing the
benefits and detriments that are likely to flow from different methods of
presidential influence. Ultimately, the Artide contends that White House
or OMB "micromanagemenf' of particular agency policies is ineffective
and even counterproductive. 7 Although the present administrative state
begs for strong presidential guidance, behind-the-scenes interactions
between the White House and agencies with respect to particular
regulatory actions can exacerbate the problems of special interest influence
over regulation. Instead, the President should exert influence by what I
term "big picture managemenf-inculcating an overarching policy vision
in administrative decision-makers. 8

13. See Colin S. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 519, 520 (1987). The
complexity and quick pace of modem society, in practice, have forced Congress to create an
administrative state to make and implement regulatory policy. Because the President has
greater influence over administrative agencies than over Congress and the courts, this
dependence on the administrative state has translated generally into increased presidential
power. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 Colum. L Rev. 452, 503 (1989).
14. Such review can allow members of OMB staff to factor their particular values into the
regulatory balance along with those Congress intended to underlie the regulatory scheme. See
McGarity, supra note 8, at 454, 456; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 191-92. Even when
the choice is explicitly made by the President, rather than worked out by OMB and the
agency, regulatory review overrides Congress's choice that it is the agency that will perform
the balancing. Oliver A. Houck, President X and the New (Approved) Decisionmaking, 36
Am. U. L Rev. 535, 554 (1987). This argument presumes that Congress may vest decisionmaking authority in subordinate officials and provides that the President may not substitute
his judgements for those of the designated subordinate, a proposition that most consider
uncontroversial. See PhilipJ. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No
Stranger, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 557, 563 & n.34 (1987); McGarity, supra note 8, at 465.
15. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 457; Morrison, supra note 8, at 1064.
16. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 456-57; Morrison, supra note 8, at 1067 & n.28.
17. Others have noted the connection between efficacy of presidential review of agency
policy and the distinction between micro and macromanagement. See Harold H. Bruff,
Presidential Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 533, 540 (1989)
(impugning macromanagement as beyond the President's capability); Sidney A. Shapiro,
Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 24-26
(condemning both White House and Capitol micromanagement because these institutions
lack the expertise of agencies and centralized micromanagement is inflexible).
18. My position is most similar to that of Peter Strauss and Cass Sunstein who concluded
that "the proper ambit of the executive orders [is] to embody a general process for shaping
agency policy-making, rather than a particularized process for displacing it." Strauss &
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 182.
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"Micromanagement" refers to White House or, more accurately, OMB
review of every major agency rulemaking or policy decision, with the aim
of achieving the outcome that reviewers think the President desires in each
instance. Such a review process invites OMB to rebalance the factors
already weighed by the agency. In contrast, "big picture managemen"
entails presidential definition of broad goals that would influence agency
policy-making without directly dictating the outcome of particular
decisions. The requirement that agency policies be cost justified (i.e., a
preference for economic efficiency) is one possible overarching outlook.
Others might include a preference for regulation by market incentives
rather than by command and control prescriptions, a call for decentralized
"site specific" regulation rather than centralized uniform regulation, or a
requirement that agencies place a premium on reducing risks, especially
when considering health, safety, or environmental regulations.
Before setting to the analytic task outlined, it is helpful to clarify the
scope within which this Article examines presidential influence on agency
policy. First, the Article focuses almost exclusively on economic, health,
and safety regulation, and does not seriously consider how the arguments
apply to regulatory programs that provide social services and explicitly
redistribute wealth. Programs within this focus often pit the desires of one
discrete interest group against those of another; regulation will necessarily
create winners and losers. Congress has proven itself hesitant to regulate
directly in such situations.' 9 In addition, specification and implementation
of health, safety, and economic regulations usually require technical
scientific or economic analyses, which in turn demand an expertise that
most legislators do not have. Wealth redistributing programs, in contrast,
pit a class of intended beneficiaries against the general public fisc. Also,
establishment and evaluation of such programs often require less technical
scientific or economic analyses. Hence, Congress may be better able to
monitor such programs and devise effective means for implementing them
than it can for economic, health, and safety regulation.0
Second, the Article limits its remarks to agency policy-setting in the
context of notice and comment rulemaking, primarily because rulemaking
is the avenue of policy-setting on which the White House has explicitly
focused its efforts to control agencies.!2' This does not imply that
presidential influence on agency policy-making via adjudication, statements
of general agency policy, or interpretations of statutes-none of which are
19.
20.

See Percival, supra note 2, at 194.
These differences between economic, health and safety regulation, and wealth

redistribution programs do not necessarily render the big picture approach inappropriate for
explicitly wealth redistributing regulation. I simply have not considered the approach as
applied to redistributive regulation and hence have reached no conclusion regarding its
propriety in the redistributive context.
21. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(e), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,737-38 (1993) (defining
"regulatory action" as "any substantive action by an agency... that promulgates or is

expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation").

PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE
governed by notice and comment procedures-is any less significantL
But issues such as the need for independence in making factually laden
determinations in adjudicatory settings complicate the question of how, if
at all, the President should go about influencing adjudicatory decisions.25
Also, concerns about presidential influence encouraging policies aimed at
appeasing special interest groups increase once the background of a
subsequent rulemaking proceeding and judicial review is removed. Thus
the absence of these checks raises a host of additional issues that, although
interesting, lie -beyond the scope of this Article. 24
This Article begins by analyzing in greater detail the need for
presidential oversight of agency policy-making. It then considers
presidential micromanagement as a means of providing such oversight, and
explains why such micromanagement is problematic. The Article goes on
to argue that a big picture approach to presidential influence provides the
needed presidential oversight of agency policy-making in a manner that is
likely to minimize the potential detriments of presidential control. Finally,
the Article uses the big picture versus micromanagement dimension to
evaluate the current presidential regulatory review program and, where
appropriate, suggests modifications to that program.
I.

THE NEED FOR PRESIDENTIAL OVERSIGHT

A. Failureof Congressional Oversight
The need for presidential oversight of agency policy-making stems
from tle nature of the modem administrative state and Congress's inability
to monitor effectively such policy-making after the fact. Today the role of
government extends beyond mere protection of private property and
provision of enforcement mechanisms for private agreements. Most citizens
expect the federal government to regulate private markets when they are
characterized by imperfections or externalities,2s to prohibit activities that
threaten public health and welfare,2 6 and generally to create opportunities

22. At least one commentator has noted that some of the arguments regarding the
propriety of presidential influence of agency policy apply as well to policy-setting via
adjudication. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 448-49 (noting that the coordination of agency
policy applies equally well to policy set by adjudication, and therefore does not imply a
presidential right to extensive ex parte intervention into particular administrative proceedings).
23. Cf Bruff, supra note 11, at 454 n.11 (contending that the lack of procedural
protections for rulemaking compared to formal adjudication calls for greater presidential
influence in the rulemaking process).
24. Although much of my analysis is relevant to the propriety of presidential influence
outside the substantive rulemaking context, in general, concerns about independence of
adjudicatory decision-makers and lack of procedural and judicial checks over other methods
by which agencies establish policy would lead to a condusion that greater restrictions on
presidential influence are needed outside the rulemaking paradigm.
25. For a description of the types of market imperfections that justify government
regulation, see Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 15-35 (1982).
26. Statutes that aim to prevent pollution and to ensure safe workplaces, for example, fall
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for individuals to pursue their personal fulfillment.27 This expansive
federal role entails the government setting policies on many complex
regulatory matters and often requires a quick governmental response to
regulatory problems. Unfortunately the legislative process is cumbersome
and geared toward political deal-making rather than definition of coherent
policy. 28 Thus, it may be impossible for Congress to achieve its regulatory
goals by enacting detailed statutory prescriptions; Congress may have to
delegate broad policy-setting discretion to agencies, which it may not be
able to control.2
Some recent attempts by Congress to control agency discretion by
detailed statutory prescription--most notably those directing EPA
action-illustrate the potential problems with this approach to legislative
control over regulatory policy. Legislators tend to promise to meet the
electorate's aspirations without seriously considering the costs of doing so.
Hence, when Congress dictates detailed policy it often promises the
impossible and fails to fund adequately the programs it establishes. 2

within this category of expected federal activities. See, ag., 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (West Supp.
1994) (stating that the primary goal of the Clean Air Act is preventing pollution); 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 651 (West 1985) (stating the purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
27. Reducing unemployment, assuring equal opportunity in employment and education,
supporting education and research, and funding public works projects are examples of
government programs to expand individual opportunities for fulfillment. See Roads to Reform,
supra note 5, at 68; DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1077.
28. Bruff, supra note 17, at 542-43 (arguing that the fragmented and nonhierarchical
nature of Congress makes it ill-suited to coordinate policy); DeMuth 8: Ginsburg, supra note
7, at 1077 (asserting that the legislative process is too cumbersome and inefficient to allow
Congress to supervise present day regulatory activities).
29. Historically, from the time of the New Deal until the mid 1970s, Congress invariably
chose to delegate broad powers to the regulatory agency. See Richard J. Lazarus, The
Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA. Quis Custodiet Ipso Custodes Who
Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves?, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991, at 205, 207;
Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89
Colum. L Rev. 427, 427-30 (1989).
30. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke LJ. 819, 828 (noting a trend towards
more detailed statutory prescriptions). It is generally acknowledged that the 1984 Amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 3221-93 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), parts of the 1986 Superfund Amendments, Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, 1613-1782, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 26,
29 & 42 U.S.C.) and much of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 101549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2399-2712 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), were
prompted by congressional dissatisfaction with the EPA's lack of aggressive regulation under
these statutes. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty
Years of Law and Politics, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991, at 249, 307.
31. See William Ruckleshaus, Environmental Protection: A Brief History of the
Environmental Movement in America and the Implications Abroad, 15 Envti. L. 455, 460
(1985) (noting the prescriptive nature of environmental laws). Congress's approach to control
of environmental policy is more the exception than the rule. This exception may reflect
several inherent aspects of environmental law it may reflect as well a distrust of White House
attempts to micromanage policy delegated to the EPA under initial environmental legislation.
See Lazarus, supra note 29, at 221-26.
32. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal

PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE
Statutory action-forcing mechanisms meant to coerce agencies to deliver
these promises, such as deadlines for adopting regulations and citizen suit
provisions,ss leave agency agendas vulnerable to efforts by particular
interest groups that may not have the public interest at heart.M Thus the
EPA, for example, often finds itself prioritizing its regulatory programs
based on pressures from members of Congress, whose constituents may
have a peculiar environmental concern, or lawsuits by environmental
groups that also have their unique peeves, rather than according to
objective assessments of which regulations are likely to provide the greatest
benefit.!5 Detailed statutory prescription of policy does not appear to be
the panacea for the country's regulatory woes.'
Moreover, even when the legislature means to constrain agency policysetting tightly by statute, pragmatic considerations may lead Congress to
leave the agency significant discretion.3 7 Congress frequently does not
have sufficient information to prescribe an effective policy when it adopts
legislation aimed at alleviating a particular problem.-" Congress also is
unlikely to have the expertise to write statutory provisions governing the
details of regulatory policy in the myriad of regulatory contexts that arise.
In addition, statutory prescriptions, once enacted, are not easily changed.
Hence, detailed statutory provisions may become outdated or a consensus
may develop that they are unwise,39 yet they may remain on the books,

Environmental Law, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1991, at 311, 313. For a detailed
description of the numerous deadlines and requirements placed on the EPA and the dearth
of funding with which to meet them, see id. at 323-30.
33. See Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 30, at 253-54; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659(a) (2)(West Supp. 1994) (1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
authorizing citizens' suits against the EPA under CERCIA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (authorizing private citizens to sue any person who violates an emission standard
under the Clean Air Act as well as to sue the EPA Administrator for failing to perform any
nondiscretionary act).
34. This has led one scholar to conclude that "[i]t is hard to imagine a worse way to
apportion agency resources." R. Shep Melnick, Administrative Law and Bureaucratic Reality,
44 Admin. L Rev. 245, 250 (1992).
35. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, The Nation's Hazardous Waste Management Program at a Crossroads 8-9 (1990);
Lazarus, supra note 29, at 230. The ability of interest groups to sue the EPA for failing to
meet impossible deadlines has given these groups leverage to negotiate "consent decrees" with
the agency and thereby dictate aspects of substantive policy as well as the EPA's agenda. See
Lazarus, supra note 32, at 334.
36. See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 25 & n.178.
37. In terms of agency theory, this is a particular example of a principal realizing that
this step can also
although it "can avoid agency losses by limiting an agent's discretion ....
make it more difficult for the agent to serve the principal's interest." Shapiro, supra note 17
at 4. See also Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3J.L. Econ. & Org., Fall 1987, at 243, 256-57.
38. See Lazarus, supra note 29, at 228 (noting that sufficient information to develop
environmental regulation may not exist when Congress first calls for such regulation).
39. As William Eskridge has phrased it: "[Glaps and ambiguities exist in all statutes....
As society changes, adapts to the statute, and generates new variations of the problem which
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hindering effective regulation. Perhaps for this reason, even when
Congress has sought to control regulatory policy explicitly by statute, it
frequently has done so by mandating regulatory deadlines or results that
the agency must achieve rather than by directly specifying mechanisms to
achieve the statutory goals.4 In choosing such mechanisms, an agency still
may have to balance potentially conflicting values that Congress has
identified as relevant to the statutory scheme, but for which Congress has
given no prescription about how to factor into particula- regulatory
decisions. 4 ' More disturbingly, in practice, an agency operating under
detailed statutory prescriptions may still be forced to import its own value
choices into those the statute explicitly makes relevant. For example,
regardless of the detail with which statutes prescribe policy, if Congress
does not appropriate sufficient funding for full implementation, an agency
will have to make trade-offs between the regulatory programs it
administers.42
In other words, the size and complexity of the government's
regulatory role make it impossible for Congress to set forth sufficiently
detailed criteria in statutes that would both dictate regulatory decisions in
particular contexts and still be sufficiently flexible to allow wise and
efficient regulation. 3 Pragmatically, Congress is forced to grant agencies

gave rise to the statute, the unanticipated gaps and ambiguities proliferate." William N.
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479, 1480 (1987); see also
Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 6 (1982); Jerry L Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org.,
Spring 1985, at 81, 96-98.
40. Frustration with the inefficacy of statutory deadlines for regulation and citizen suit
enforcement has prompted a novel type of action-forcing mechanism-the hammer
provision. A hammer provision does specify detailed regulatory requirements, but these only
take effect if the agency does not itself regulate by a prescribed deadline. See Percival, supra
note 2, at 152-53; see also Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6921(d)(8) (1988); Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2644
(West Supp. 1994). A hammer provision thus leaves the agency discretion to generate a
regulatory scheme in the first instance, but threatens the agency with forfeiture of that
discretion should the agency fail to comply with the statutory deadline.
41. See Barksdale, supra note 8, at 285 (providing examples of statutes that require the
agency to exercise discretion in balancing statutory "values").
42. For example, chronic under-funding of the EPA has contributed to that agency's
inability to implement much of what is already required by environmental statutes. See
Percival, supra note 2, at 202. Faced with such under-funding, deadlines for regulations
cannot cure the problem; the EPA is simply forced to choose the statutory deadlines with
which it will comply. See Lazarus, supra note 29, at 230. Action-forcing mechanisms such as
citizen suits may constrain agency discretion, but only by forcing the agency into an entirely
reactive posture that discourages the agency from rationally prioritizing its regulatory agenda.
Perhaps most importantly for this Article, even action-forcing mechanisms leave the agency
broad discretion about how to implement the regulatory schemes it chooses to address.
43. Edward L Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
369, 395 (1989); see also Glicksman & Schroeder, supra note 30, at 251 (noting that when
Congress engages in specifying detailed policy, it tends to enact provisions that essentially
codify raw political deals between competing interest groups). For analyses of the deleterious
effects of statutory specification of deadlines or detailed solutions in particular regulatory

PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE
much policy-setting discretion. 44 Unless there is some constraint other
than detailed statutory prescription to keep agency regulations consistent
with the values of the polity, such broad delegation of policy-setting
functions runs counter to the principle that the government should rely on
democratic processes to define fundamental policy.
At the outset, it is helpful to note that judicial review of agency
decision-making pursuant to broad statutory delegations is unlikely to
provide the needed constraint. To review agency decisions meaningfully,
ensuring they comport with the polity's values, judges would have to
determine the appropriate balance of values that underlie the statute.
But the problem arises precisely when Congress has not indicated how that
balance is to be struck. Hence, courts would have to import their own
notions of the values that appropriately underlie the statute. This does not
solve the problem because the counter-majoritarian courts are shielded
from electoral accountability to a greater extent than the agency.4
Judicial review can at best ensure that the agency thought hard about its
decision, reasoned logically, and stayed within the permissive bounds of
discretion set by the statute; it cannot legitimately reverse the agency for
failing to comport withjudges' ideas about the polity's values.46
That thejudiciary's lack of political accountability renders it unable to
provide the necessary constraint suggests that congressional monitoring of
agency decisions after the fact might better constrain agency policy.
Although Congress cannot write sufficiently detailed yet flexible statutes to
constrain agency decision-making ex-ante, the legislature has several other
means of influencing agency policy. For example, Congress can overrule,
ex-post, agency policies with which it disagrees. More pragmatically,
members of Congress can communicate their views about the meaning of a
statute and how it should be implemented in formal congressional
hearings and by informal contacts. 4 Congress can also threaten to
decrease agency appropriations if an agency persists in implementing a

contexts, see generally Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional
Micromanagement: A Potential Collision in Clean Air Interpretation, 16 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev.
175 (1992) (discussing statutory micromanagement of mobile source pollution under the
Clean Air Act); Craig N. Oren, Detail and Delegation: A Study in Statutory Specificity, 15
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 143 (1990) (evaluating detailed legislative prescription of the "prevention
of significant deterioration" program of the Clean Air Act).
44. See Roads to Reform, supra note 5, at 73.
45. Cf. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decision Making
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 83, 112-13,115 (1994)
(discussing problems of judges substituting their values for those of the agency when
reviewing agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions).
46. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
Harv. L Rev. 1512, 1572 (1992).
47. See Lazarus, supra note 29, at 208-09; Morris S. Ogul, Congressional Oversight:
Structures and Incentives, in Congress Reconsidered 317, 322-23 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce
I. Oppenheimer eds., 2d ed. 1981); Rubin, supra note 43, at 402. For a description of the
various methods of oversight of agency action that Congress uses, see Joel D. Aberbach,
Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight (1990).
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policy with which enough influential legislators disagree.48
Although congressional monitoring and after-the-fact restraints
provide an important check on agency decision-making, 9 congressional
review, like judicial oversight, suffers from some shortcomings.- Such
review is especially inadequate if we would like agency regulation to
provide a coherent framework aimed at furthering some notion of the
public interest rather than merely to accommodate concerns of powerful
special interest groups."'
One problem with legislative review after the fact is its inability to
generate a coherent policy agenda. Congressional decision-making is
extremely fragmented;5 2 Congress addresses many diverse issues that are
introduced by legislators with particular goals often not shared by any
majority:s Therefore it is not surprising that the legislative process is
geared toward building coalitions by structuring compromises and deals
often regarding items that are entirely unrelated.5 If we desire coherent
regulatory policies rather than raw political deals, we should not look to
Congress to generate them. Congress is better suited to react to executive
proposals, thereby ensuring that such proposals are acceptable to a
sufficiently broad cross-section of the electorate.5 Only by assuming this
48. Appropriations committees tend to be more aggressive than committees with
substantive assignments in proactively monitoring agency programs. SeeAberbach, supra note
47, at 94; Leloup, infra note 60, at 109; se also Bernard Rosen, Holding Government

Bureaucracies Accountable 62-64 (2d ed. 1989)(discussing the appropriations process as a
means for oversight generally); 2 Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 2 Study on
Federal Regulation: Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies, S. Doc. No. 95-26, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1977) (describing the appropriations process as "the most potent form of
Congressional oversight").
49. See Seidenfeld, supra note 46 at 1551-73.
50. SeeJeremy Rabkin, Micromanaging the Administrative Agencies, 100 Pub. Interest,
Summer 1990, at 116, 120; se also Aberbach, supra note 47, at 200-01 (concluding that
congressional oversight is effective for "correcting errors directly affecting the...
organized... citizenry and improving policy at the margins," but is uncoordinated and
responsive only to the most vociferous interest groups); Ogul, supra note 47, at 329-30
(blaming shortcomings in congressional oversight on lack of incentives for congress-persons to
engage in meaningful oversight).
51. See Lazarus, supra note 29, at 220 (noting the relationship between congressional
oversight and demands of special interest groups); id. at 224 (describing how the division of
congressional oversight of the EPA between various committees results in inconsistent
messages from Congress).
52. See Bruff, supra note 17, at 542-44 (detailing how the rise of the subcommittee system
has made it more difficult for Congress to coordinate regulatory policy); Lazarus, supra note
29, at 230.
53. See Aberbach, supra note 47, at 200.
54. In some cases, Congress may not be able to work out a deal even when there is
general consensus that a regulatory response to a problem is needed. Robert Percival has
suggested that this is often the case for efivironmental regulation because Congress simply will
not take the heat for the authorizing regulation that harms any significant interest group.
Percival, supra note 2, at 194-95.
55. According to an ABA Report. "the most appropriate and effective role for Congress is
to review and, where necessary, to curb unwise presidential intervention [into regulation]."
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reactive posture
55 will congressional action end up oriented toward the
public interest.
Another pervasive weakness of congressional review arises because
Congress is not well structured to monitor and appropriately correct
agency policy decisions that implement discretion-granting statutes.
Effective monitoring of implementation depends on maintaining day-to-day
awareness of regulatory matters, and requires collection and analysis of
voluminous quantities of information, much of which is often technical in
nature. 7" Because Congress as a whole cannot provide sufficient
monitoring, it delegates that task to congressional committees and, more
frequently, to subcommittees.""
The smaller size and focused interests of congressional committees
allows them greater influence over agency policy than can be exercised by
Congress as a whole. The influence of committees, however, is limited by
their need to resort to action by the entire legislature to enforce any
threats they make, and therefore to accommodate a variety of political
viewpoints. 59 In addition, a particular agency may be subject to oversight
by several committees which have competing goals.60 This limits the ability
of congressional committees to ensure that agency policies are coherent.
To the extent that committees can influence agency policy, such
influence is unlikely to embody any conception of the public interest.
Committee influence over agency policy may not reflect the desires of the
entire Congress.6' Members of Congress often are assigned to committees

Roads to Reform, supra note 5, at 73.
56. Arthur Maass, Congress and the Common Good 8-18 (1983).
57. Even members of congressional committee staffs recognize that the "detailed,
complex and tedious" nature of regulatory oversight renders Congress institutionally incapable
of engaging in "effective, constructive" oversight. See, e.g., Steven Shimberg, Checks and
Balance: Limitations on the Power of Congressional Oversight, 54 Law & Contemp. Probs.,
Autumn 1991, at 242, 245-46.
58. See Aberbach, supra note 47, at 79; Lazarus, supra note 29, at 209; see also Lawrence
C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, The House in Transition: Change and Consolidation, in
Congress Reconsidered 31, 41-43 (Lawrence Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 2d ed.
1981) (noting the trend toward greater reliance on subcommittees, especially in the House of
Representatives). Henceforth, I use the term "committees" to refer to both committees and
subcommittees.
59. See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 14.
60. For example, substantive oversight committees are known for pushing their positive
regulatory agendas while appropriation committees play the precise opposite role by
pressuring agencies to cut their regulatory budgets. See Lance T. Leloup, The Fiscal Congress:
Legislative Control of the Budget 108-09 (1980); Allen Schick, Congress and Money
Budgeting, Spending and Taxing 416 (1980); see also Morris S. Ogul, Congress Oversees the
Bureaucracy. Studies in Legislative Supervision 183-85 (1976) (citing several examples in
which different oversight committees had conflicting goals on an issue).
61. This problem with committee oversight has been pithily phrased as resulting from
Congress "act[ing] through a fraction that may be a faction." Arthur MacMahon, Congressional Oversight of Administration: The Power of the Purse, in Legislative Politics 185, 196
(Theodore Lowi ed., 2d ed. 1965); see also Farina, supra note 13, at 510; Lazarus, supra note
32, at 356-57; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 15.
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that they request because their district has some peculiar interest in the
matters with which the committee deals. 2 Hence, committee members are
often motivated by concerns different from, and sometimes even at odds
with, the concerns of the general public. 3 In addition, committees
themselves depend on knowledgeable and dedicated staff members, who in
turn often depend on agencies and representatives of focused interest
groups (e.g., regulated entities) to provide them with information and
analyses.64 Thus, the committee system biases congressional responses
toward acceding to special interest demands and reaffirming agency policy
choices." In other words, the interdependence between congressional
committees, regulated entities, and regulating agencies undercuts the
ability of Congress as an institution to constrain agency policy to comport
with generally held values.

B. PresidentialOversight as a Cure
The executive does not share the institutional barriers to action that
limit congressional oversight of agency policy. The executive is
hierarchically arranged, which allows more efficient flow of information
and analyses to the ultimate decision-maker.6 6 That decision-maker,
whether it be the President or an official to whom he has delegated the
task, can act unilaterally and therefore expediently.6 7 Thus, if any single
institution is well suited for monitoring overall government policy, it is the
White House.
Unlike the courts and even the agencies themselves, the President is

62. See Kenneth Shepsle, The GiantJigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in
the Modem House 231-38 (1978); Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Discretion, Judicial
Review, and the Gloomy World of Judge Smith, 1986 Duke LJ. 258, 272; see also Irwin N.
Gertzog, The Routinization of Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives, 20
Am. J. Pol. Sd. 693, 704 (1976) (noting about two-thirds of freshman representatives in the
89th-91st Congresses were appointed to committees they most preferred, and over 90% got
the committee assignments they desired by their fifth year).
63. SeeJ. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process: Executive Bureau - Legislative Committee
Relations 26-27 (1965); Shepsle, supra note 62, at 259-60.
64. In fact, this has led political scientists to posit the regulatory iron triangle that they
say leads to agency capture with the congressional committees, the regulating agency, and the
regulated industry each making up one leg of the triangle. See Gordon Adams, The Iron
Triangle: The Politics of Defense Contracting 24-26 (1981); Harold Seidman, Politics, Position
and Power. The Dynamics of Federal Organization 41 (2d ed. 1975); Aaron B. Wildavsky, The
New Politics of the Budgetary Process 17 (1988); MarshallJ. Breger, Defining Administrative
Law. A Review of "An Introduction To Administrative Justice in the United States," 60 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 268, 282 & n.98 (1991).
65. See Dodd & Oppenheimer, supra note 58, at 49; Harter, supra note 14, at 570;
Seidenfeld, supra note 46, at 1567.
66. See Bruff, supra note 17, at 554 ("Only the executive branch, with its hierarchical
organization, has the capacity to formulate a consistent set of instructions to the bureaucracy.").
67. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 452; see also Cutler & Johnson, supra note 5, at 1411
(reasoning that the President can act more expediently than Congress in formulating and
articulating national policy goals).
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directly elected and hence politically accountable. Thus, we should expect
presidential influence on agency decision-making to constrain agency
policy to conform to democratically determined valuesee Furthermore,
the President is the unique official who is answerable to the entire
electorate.69 Consequently, the President stands to pay a price if his
policies7 benefit special interest groups to the detriment of society as a
whole. 0
Finally, because the President's jurisdiction is universal, he must
maintain a generalist's perspective that allows him to recognize when
various agencies' policies act at cross-purposes. He has the incentive to
coordinate the policies of various agencies, each of which may be
responding to its unique perspective and peculiar constituency. 7'
Moreover, the White House may be the only governmental institution
capable of successfully coordinating government policy and creating a
coherent agenda because only the President has the political base
necessary to pressure Congress and the agencies to follow his lead on a
wide variety of issues. 2 In sum, presidential influence is crucial to keeping
agency policies politically accountable because the White House is the only
institution with the structure, incentives, and power to perform the job
with an eye towards the public interest.
II. PROBLEMS WrrH THE MICROMANAGEMENT APPROACH To PRESIDENTIAL
INFLUENCE OF AGENCY POLICY

Having concluded that the President has an important role in
influencing agency policy-setting, how he should play that role remains an
open question. The first tenet of the "big picture" thesis asserts that the
President should not try to micromanage agency policy by having the
White House substitute its decision for that of the agency regarding
specific regulations. As argued in detail below, such micromanagement is
unlikely to result in effective implementation of the President's policy
preferences and is instead likely to encourage special-interest-oriented
regulation.

68. See Pierce, supra note 5, at 520-21.
69. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 190.
70. See Harter, supra note 14, at 566-67; see also James C. Miller III et al., A Note on
Centralized Regulatory Reform, 43 Pub. Choice 83, 86 (1984) (arguing that centralized
regulatory oversight would decrease the control exercised by concentrated (i.e., special) as
opposed to diffuse (i.e., public) interest groups); cf Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 190
(noting that only the President, "byvirtue of his accountability and capacity for centralization,
is able to energize and direct regulatory policy").
71. See Roads to Reform supra note 5, at 163 (separate statement of Judge Henry
Friendly).
72. See Diver, supra note 13, at 521; cf McGarity, supra note 8, at 448 (noting that the
President's position at the apex of the bureaucratic hierarchy facilitates his coordination of
regulatory policy).
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A. Problems of Effwacy and the Potentialfor a Runaway OMB
Although at first glance White House review of every major agency
decision would seem to allow the President greater control over agency
policy, a closer look at the reality of such review raises some doubts about
whether that is true." The President and his close personal aides cannot
directly review all or even any significant portion of agency rulemaking
decisions. 74 He must delegate that task to low-level staff members whom
the President may not know at all, and trust that they will forward to him
those few cases that warrant his personal attention."' Thus, not
surprisingly, every President in the last twenty years has relied on OMB for
the first line of agency rulemaking review. 6 Although the President has
somewhat more control over the make-up of OMB staff than agency staff,
this difference in control does not lead ineluctably to greater control over
low-level OMB decisions;77 other weaknesses in the OMB review process
may more than offset any effect from greater control over personnel.!'
One limit on the potential for OMB review to ensure that agency
regulations are consistent with the President's view of the public interest is
OMB's lack of expertise regarding the regulatory matters it reviews.79 The
President can exercise greater control over the make-up of OMB staff
largely because the staff is much smaller than that of the agencies it tries to
constrain. OMB does not have the personnel or resources to develop the
knowledge or the data necessary to analyze independently most agency
proposed rules."0 Although some see the reviewers' task merely as asking
the questions "that a sophisticated layman would ask,"8 ' to perform even
73. Even before White House review of agency decisions matured, political scientists had
recognized "[t]he problem of a White House staff grown beyond the personal attention of a
President." Stephen Hess, Organizing the Presidency 158-59 (1976).
74. See Glen 0. Robinson, American Bureaucracy: Public Choice and Public Law 103
(1991); Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 Am.
U. L. Rev. 491, 509 (1987).
75. See Percival, supra note 2, at 180.
76. See Thomas D. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality:. The Role of Regulatory Analysis in
the Federal Bureaucracy 18-22 (1991); Percival, supra note 2, at 128.
77. "In fact, these executive interveners [such as OMB] are themselves part of the
administrative bureaucracy and, as such, present the same type of monitoring and control
problems (agency cost problems in the vernacular of public choice theory) as the agencies
they seek to influence." Robinson, supra note 74, at 102; see also Percival, supra note 2, at 139
(noting that President Ford decreased OMB's practical ability to influence regulations because
of concern that OMB vras moving into departments at "too low a level").
78. See Bruff, supra note 17, at 557 (noting that the inconsistency of OIRA review is
exacerbated by the lack of formal training programs or written directions for low-level
reviewers). But cf. Diver, supra note 13 at 531 (asserting that OMB staff "are as close to the
President in perspective and preferences as any group of appointed officials is likely to be").
79. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 191.
80. See Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, OMB Influence on Agency
Regulations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1986); Bruff, supra note 17, at 558; Morrison, supra
note 8, at 1067.
81. DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1083-84; iee also Bruff, supra note 17, at 557
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this task OMB depends on data and analyses from outsiders. Most often
OMB obtains these data and analyses either from focused interest groups
who monitor the agency or from the agency itself.2 In the former
instance, OMB's influence might exacerbate the problem of specialinterest-oriented regulation; in the latter instance, OMB's ability to
constrain agency discretion may be compromised. in short, the same
shortcomings that result from congressional committees' needs for
information also plague OMB review and limit the efficacy of such review.
Without further empirical analyses of the effects of OMB attempts to
micromanage agency rulemaking decisions, it is difficult to assess the
extent of this information-based limitation. The few anecdotal analyses that
have been done, however, indicate that the limitation is significant. For
example, out of five examples of regulatory review studied by Professor
Tom McGarity, two manifest evidence that OMB's inability to rebut agencyprovided analyses limited the effectiveness of its review s
The first example involved the EPA's lead phase-down regulations for
gasoline. 4 In 1981, OMB and then Vice President Bush's Task Force on
Regulatory Relief pushed the EPA to scale back its proposed regulations
for decreasing the amount of lead in gasoline. Using Executive Order
12,291's cost benefit standard as the excuse for regulatory relief, the EPA
was asked to revisit its proposed time frame for the lead phase-down.8
Although the EPA did not prepare a formal regulatory impact statement,
its cost-benefit analyses not only supported retention of the original EPA
rule, but also suggested that a stricter rule was warranted.8 6 "Ultimately,
even OMB and the Bush task force acquiesced in a standard that was more

(OIRA review is similar to generalist "hard look" review). Others, however, cite instances in
which OMB desk officers clearly reevaluate the merits of a regulation. Se, ag., Thomas 0.
McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, Workers at Risk: The Failed Promise of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration 232-33 (1993); Morrison, supra note 8, at 1066; see also
Shapiro, supra note 17, at 24 (arguing that OMB's role in reviewing agency rules has not been
to provide a generalist's perspective to overcome parochial agency perspective).
82. Formally, most of the data upon which OIRA relies comes from the Regulatory
Impact Analysis that an agency must prepare to accompany rules it submits for OMB review.
See McGarity, supra note 76, at 273. OIRA reviewers, however, have actively sought industry
responses to agency RIAs on many occasions. See id. at 286.
83. The other three examples did not demonstrate meaningful OMB influence on the
agency's proposed rules either, although the reasons the review did not have an effect
appeared unrelated to OMB's difficulty in getting and assessing data. In one case, the Reagan
OMB was itself uncertain about whether to push for a more cost beneficial rule when that
would result in greater regulation. See McGarity, supra note 76, at 61. In a second case, the
agency proposed to deregulate, and hence OMB did not even require the agency to perform
a regulatory analysis. See id. at 69-70. The third case was primarily a political issue in which
cost-benefit data played an insignificant role. Interestingly, however, the issue reached the
Vice President's desk, and he sided with the agency against OMB's objections. See id. at 109.
84. For a synopsis of the development of the EPA's lead phase down regulations, see id.
at 31-44.
85. See id. at 31; Robert D. Hershey, Jr., U.S. May Repeal Rules Limiting Lead in
Gasoline, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1982, at A18.
86. See McGarity, supra note 76, at 44.
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stringent than the standard that the task force had originally wanted to
repeal." O
The second example involved the Department of Agriculture's
regulation of mechanically separated meat!' In 1982 the Department
amended regulations that had required meat packers to list the percentage
of powdered bone prominently on the front of packages of mechanically
separated meat8s Despite an independent market sun,ey concluding that
this information would make a difference to a significant number of
consumers, the Regulatory Impact Analysis failed to include this loss of
information as a cost of the amendment, and OMB's Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) analysts failed to spot this omission.9
Even if OMB would not have to rely on outsiders for most of the
information it uses in reviewing agency decisions, it might still be
ineffective at ensuring that agencies implement tw President's policies.
OMB exerts much of its influence via low-level OIRA desk officers who
screen proposed agency rules.91 Because the President cannot easily
monitor this screening process, he cannot be confident that the input of
low-level reviewers reflects his own outlook 9 2 To the extent that these
reviewers add any coherent pressure on government policy,93 such
pressure is likely to reflect OIRA's own institutional biases. Because OIRA
sees its job as checking overzealous regulators, its reviewers are apt to
discount the benefit of government intervention.9 Overall, one might

87. Id. at 44.
88. For a general description of the Department of Agriculture's efforts to regulate

mechanically separated meat, see McGarity, supra note 76,at 7-88.
89. Standards and Labeling Requirements for Mechanically Separated (Species) and
Products in Which It Is Used: Final Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,214, 28,222 (1982).
90. McGarity, supra note 76, at 86-87. Despite the amendment, food processors did not
buy mechanically separated meat (MSM) apparently fearing that consumers would hesitate to
buy a product that listed MSM anywhere as an ingredient. In 1987, at the prodding of several
sausage companies, the Department of Agriculture proposed an additional amendment
allowing sale of products containing less than 10% MSM without any indication that they
contained MSM (even in the list of ingredients). OMB objected to this second amendment on
grounds that it would impose the cost of lost information about the product on consumers,
and the Department never proceeded to adopt the amendment. McGarity, supra note 76, at
84-85.
91. See Bruff, supra note 17, at 557.
92. See Margaret Gilhooley, Executive Oversight of Administrative Rulemaking- Disclosing
the Impact, 25 Ind. L. Rev. 299, 311 (1991); McGarity, supra note 8, at 451, 455; Percival,
supra note 2, at 182; Robinson, supra note 74, at 102.
93. Because of the individual nature of each desk officer's review, OIRA review may not
exert any coherent pressure. Sm Bruff, supra note 17, at 557 (noting the decentralized nature
of OIRA review).
94. See Bruff, supra note 17, at 552-53 (noting that attitudes due to OMB historically
being the skeptical reviewer of budget requests probably carry over to OIRA's supervision of
rulemaking); McGarity supra note 76, at 287; Percival, supra note 2, at 181; Strauss 8g
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 191-92; see also George C.Eads &Michael Fix, Relief or Reform?
Reagan's Regulatory Dilemma 49 (1984) (noting that the Nixon OMB "at times press[ed] its
own institutional interests (which generally were opposed to the EPA's)").
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thus expect that OMB interference in particular regulatory actions would
impose procedural hurdles and
delays, 9 and generally would discourage
96
agenda.
regulatory
any positive
Again, the data needed to evaluate this expectation are limited. It
appears that OMB review under President Reagan did not result in more
efficient regulation; it merely made adoption of positive regulation more
difficult, 97 which is consistent with the posited OMB bias.98 Unfortunately, although the ostensible goal of regulatory review by the Reagan OMB
was efficiency, deregulation was dearly an unstated goal. 9 Thus, while
Reagan's review program filed to achieve its stated objective, it may have
been effective nonethelessl °° Evidence from the Garter administration's
regulatory review program may be more enlightening. Although President
Garter's program was more limited than President Reagan's and did not
appear aimed at deregulation, it too indicates some propensity for OMB
review to discourage regulation. 1 1
The reactive nature of executive micromanagement of agency policy
limits the efficacy of such review in yet another manner: Reactive
management by itself cannot ensure coherence of various agencies'

95. See Morrison, supra note 8, at 1064; Percival, supra note 2, at 159. According to the
National Academy of Public Administration, the "clearest impact of the regulatory
management process has apparently been in slowing down rulemaking activities." Nael Acad.
Pub. Admin., Presidential Management of Rulemaking in Regulatory Agencies 7 (1987)
[Hereinafter "NAPA Report"].
96. See Percival, supra note 2, at 159; see also id. at 161 (noting that it is not surprising
regulatory review has made EPA promulgation of regulations more difficult, but what is
surprising is "the dearth of evidence to suggest that regulatory review has resulted in truly
significant improvements in EPA regulations"); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 192
(arguing that OMB review may lead to an "undue anti-regulatory bias"). I do not mean to
imply that the goal of minimizing the costs of regulation is invalid, and its validity suggests to
me that there is some place for OMB input in the regulatory process. I do mean to say,
however, that one cannot trust OMB reviewers necessarily to share the President's outlook on
a particular regulatory question, and that therefore the means by which OMB input is
factored into regulatory decisions must be carefully structured.
97. See Percival, supra note 2, at 161.
98. See id. at 150-54; McGarity, supra note 76, at 282-83, 286-87.
99. See Houck, supra note 14, at 540; Percival, supra note 2, at 150, 184. The same
ambiguous conclusions seem to apply to regulatory review under the Bush administration. See
id.at 155.
100. That detailed OMB review of agency rules might have effectively implemented
President Reagan's deregulatory agenda does not imply that this micromanagement technique
would work for other policy visions. OMB's bias against regulation together with the added
costs imposed by OMB review on positive regulation suggest that the policy goal of
deregulation is a special case for which a micromanagement approach might be effective.
Nonetheless, Robert Percival has expressed doubt that the program was successful even if
viewed as a mechanism for providing regulatory relief to industry. Percival, supra note 2, at
184.
101. See id. at 146-47. There is also evidence that the less comprehensive regulatory review
programs of Presidents Nixon and Ford also tended to discourage regulation. See id. at 135
(describing effects of Nixon's "Quality of Life" (QOL) review program); id. at 141 (same for
Ford administration use of QOL review).
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regulatory agendas. Agencies plan their agendas without serious
consideration of the actions of their sister departments. Hence, the
planned regulations of one agency may not dovetail with those of another.
The regulatory review programs of several recent presidents have
attempted to alleviate this problem and beginning with President Reagan,
all presidents have required each executive agency to submit an annual
regulatory plan for OMB review."'2 This requirement is meant to enable
OMB to flag planned regulations that are at odds with proposed
regulations of other agencies or with the administration's overall
policies.03
This mechanism, however, will encourage coherent regulation only if
OIRA reviewers can ascertain how a particular regulation relates to the
administration's policy vision. Even then, a coherent policy agenda might
emerge only if the President can hold OMB reviewers accountable to that
vision. If the President does not announce any overarching policy themes,
OMB review of agency annual plans can only prevent agencies from
adopting inconsistent regulations, which does not encourage the agencies
initially to create their regulatory agendas with any coherent regulatory
picture in mind. Thus, OMB review of agency annual plans may be
effective at preventing two agencies from imposing conflicting requirements on regulated entities, but regulations whose goals are in tension with
the administration's unstated policy outlook are bound to slip through
OMB's regulatory sieve.' 4
Finally, there is some evidence that micromanagement of agency
decision-making by OMB played a role in Congress's recent attempts to
rein-in agency policy-setting discretion." 5 Although Congress appears
most likely to react adversely to presidential micromanagement when
102. See Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985) (governing Presidents Reagan's
and Bush's regulatory review programs); Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(c), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,738
(1993) (governing President Clinton's regulatory review program; requiring both executive
and independent agencies to prepare a "Regulatory Plan").
103. Thus, § 2(b) of Executive Order 12,866justifies the OMB as "necessary to ensure that
regulations are consistent with applicable law, the President's priorities, and the principles set
forth in this Executive order, and that decisions made by one agency do not conflict with the
policies or actions taken or planned by another agency." Regulatory Planning and Review, 58
Fed. Reg. 51,737. See also Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985) (preamble stating
purpose as, among other things, to establish Administration regulatory priorities and avoid
duplication and conflict in regulations).
104. Cf.Percival, supra note 2, at 180, 183-84 (criticizing Reagan's regulatory review
program as aimed at easing regulation on industry rather than on coordinating regulations of
various agencies).
105. See Eads & Fix, supra note 94, at 256-57; Nat'l Acad. Pub. Admin., Congressional
Oversight of Regulatory Agencies: The Need to Strike a Balance and Focus on Performance
29-30 (1989); Percival, supra note 2, at 175-76; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 16. Some
commentators have expressed the belief, however, that Congress was reacting more to the
overall hostility of the Reagan Administration to protection of the environment, regardless of
whether that hostility was pursued via micromanagement of the EPA. See, ag., Glicksman &
Schroeder, supra note 30, at 307.
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different parties control the White House and the Capitol, some adverse
reaction occurred during the Carter Administration,"' s demonstrating
that the phenomenon is not limited to times when the federal government
is divided.
To the extent that executive micromanagement triggers
statutory limitations on agency discretion or prompts congressional
attempts to micromanage agency policy by committee oversight, it
ultimately decreases the President's ability to channel agency regulations
towards the outcomes he desires.0
B. Problems of Interest Group Politics and InsiderInfluence on Regulatory

Policy
Although the President is directly accountable to the entire electorate,
imperfections in the political process and voter psychology may permit the
President to reap rewards by dictating particular regulatory outcomes to
benefit special interest groups. 09 Public choice theorists' accounts of
collective action suggest that political action may be biased in favor of
smaller groups with more focused interest on a particular issue.10
Frequently, it is a great burden to educate a dispersed set of voters
about how a particular regulatory decision harms them. This is especially
true when the ramifications of such a decision are delayed and not directly
attributable to the isolated decision, as is the case for many regulatory
decisions. For example, directly tracing the harm imposed by acid rain
from power plants is difficult because these plants emit pollutants that
disperse widely and whose effects occur slowly over a long period of time.
Hence, although it was possible to convince Congress to pass general
legislation addressing the acid rain problem, it has proven more difficult to
garner the support necessary for the EPA to adopt effective particular
regulations, which if adopted would immediately impose significant costs
on the electrical power industry."

106. S4 ag., Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearings on S. 321
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979) (statement of John Quarles, former Deputy
Administrator, EPA).
107. See Percival, supra note 2, at 173.
108. For an analysis of the deleterious effects of the contest between recent Presidents and
Congresses to micromanage agency policy, see Shapiro, supra note 17, at 24-26.
109. See Percival, supra note 2, at 195-96.
110. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical
Introduction 23 (1991); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the
Theory of Groups 48 (1965); see also William Greider, Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal
of American Democracy 108-09 (1992) (lamenting that under the pluralist understanding of
government, "the New Deal has been stood on its head and now the weak and unorganized
segments of society are the principal victims").
111. The electrical power industry channelled much of its effort to delay and weaken the
acid rain provisions of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act through White House
influence on EPA rulemaking. See Rudy Abramson, EPA Introduces New Rules for Clean Air,
L.A. Times, June 26, 1992, at A4; Daniel P. Jones, The Long Reach of the Clean Air Act,

Hartford Courant, Nov. 17, 1992, at Al; Michael Kranish, Democrats Cry Foul on Clean Air
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Even if voters could educate themselves about the impacts of
particular regulatory decisions without too much effort, presidential
influence on such decisions is not likely to protect the interest of the
general public unless voters organize to react to such decisions at the2
ballot box. Again, the costs of such organization tend to be great,1
especially if the adversely affected group is geographically, culturally, and
ideologically diverse. In most cases, the effect of any particular regulatory
policy on those with a diffuse interest in the regulatory outcome will not
be sufficiently great to justify individuals learning about the problem and
participating in an organized fashion to demand its rectification."3
Moreover, the general ideology of a candidate seems to have a greater
bearing on presidential voting than does the candidate's detailed economic
and regulatory proposals." 4 To the extent that voters focus on economics, they care more about the welfare of the national economy generally
than they do about their own financial state at the time of an election,"15
let alone about any particular decision made by an incumbent
administration. Thus, presidential elections tend to turi more on the
perceived state of the economy in an election year and the individual
candidates' abilities to inspire confidence about the future state of the
nation than on perceptions gleaned from particular 6regulatory stances
taken by a candidate or the incumbent administration."

Act, Boston Globe, May 2, 1991, at 1; see also Dana Priest & Helen Dewars, Critics of New
Pollution Rules Threaten Lawsuits, Legislation, Wash. Post June 27, 1992, at A6 (reporting
that the White House prompted the EPA to allow companies to increase their permitted levels
of air pollution emissions without an opportunity for public comment).
112. Individuals who share a desire for a particular outcome have an incentive to "free
ride" on the efforts of others in the group, which magnifies the barriers to education and
organization of large groups with diffuse interests. See Olson, supra note 110, at 15-16.
113. This conclusion is consistent with empirical evidence that individuals do not vote for
presidential candidates because of their policy positions or previous policy decisions. See infra
notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
114. See David 0. Sears et al., Self-Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and
Presidential Voting, 74 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 670, 679-82 (1980). There is even doubt about
whether the policies supported by a candidate matter at any level of generality. For example,
data indicate that the American public felt ideologically closer to the Democratic candidate in
the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections, but nonetheless voted overwhelmingly for
Republicans Ronald Reagan and George Bush. See Martin P. Wattenberg, The Rise of
Candidate-Centered Politics: Presidential Elections of the 1980s 129 (1991).
115. See Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies
155-57 (1988). In presidential elections, voters seem to take into account expectations about
their own future economic prospects, but only to a very limited extent and even in these
elections individuals do not vote based on their past personal economic well-being. Id. Past
economic performance is factored into elections only according to how well the country has
performed on the whole. Id. Only issues such as prolonged unemployment, runaway inflation,
or sudden tax increases appear capable of stimulating most voters to attend to politics. Nelson
W. Polsby & Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Contemporary Strategies of American
Electoral Politics 2 (8th ed. 1991).
116. SeeWattenberg, supra note 114, at 132; Ray C. Fair, The Effect of Economic Events
on Votes for President, 60 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 159, 171 (1978) (concluding that presidential
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Putting the insights of public choice theory together with the political
science of presidential elections suggests that groups with discretely
focused interests have an advantage any time politics comes to bear on
particular regulatory decisions. Even the President, for'whom every of-age
citizen in the country may vote, can reap political gains by dispensing
regulatory largess to groups with focused interests at the expense of the
general electorate." For example, although the nation as whole would
incur unnecessary costs from rebuilding Homestead Air Force Base, this
did not stop President Bush from promising to do so in a thinly veiled
attempt to garner increased voter support in Florida during the 1992
presidential campaign.""
The processes OMB uses to review agency proposed rules also
increase the likelihood that micromanagement of agency decisions would
cater to special interest groups. Unlike informal agency rulemaking, OMB
review is not governed by standards that encourage equal access to its
decision-making process." 9 Presumably those in the President's circle of
political friends and supporters will have greater access to OMB than will
outsiders. 2 0 Although it may be possible to limit such selective access and
require OMB to reveal communications with interest group representatives,
this will not facilitate access by representatives of diffuse interests and other

elections are affected by the state of the economy in the year of an election, but not by other
economic variables); Lewis-Beck, supra note 115, at 133-35.
117. As Glen Robinson has explained, the President is likely to obtain credit for sustained
involvement in routine bureaucratic actions only from important political constituencies,
which is "just the kind of involvement that is most difficult to justify in terms of the
president's wider obligations to the public." Robinson, supra note 74, at 104. But see DeMuth
& Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1081 (asserting that "[ajIthough presidents and legislatures are
themselves vulnerable to pressure from politically influential groups, the rulemaking
process-operating in relative obscurity from public view but lavishly attended by interest
groups-is even more vulnerable"). The influence of interest groups over presidential
elections, and hence over presidential policy, may have increased recently due to the decline
in the power of party insiders to dictate presidential nominations. See Erwin C. Hargrove &
Michael Nelson, Presidents, Politics, and Policy 162 (1984).
118. SeeEric Pianin, Hill Votes $11 Billion for Hurricane Relief, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1992,
at A3. In fact, the Bush campaign quite blatantly sought to identify and deliver public works
projects and regulatory decisions important to voters in states that he felt were key to his
reelection without any apparent consideration of the overall impact of these projects and
decisions on the nation as a whole. See William E. Clayton, Jr., Collider Bill OK'd by Bush;
Signing May Help Campaign Chances, Houston Chron., Oct. 3, 1992, at A7 (reporting
political motivations for Bush's signing of bill appropriating funds for the super collider in
Texas); Thomas H. Friedman, Selling Arms to Sell Jobs: The Signals It Sends Abroad, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 1992, § 4, at 4 (reporting promise of a contract of F15s to gain electoral
support in Missouri); Frank Luntz, Editorial: Learning From Failure, Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1992,
at A23 (noting Bush's reliance on pork barrel politics in his bid to be reelected President)..
119. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 459; Percival, supra note 2, at 168-70.
120. See Bruff, supra note 17, at 554; Shapiro, supra note 17, at 21. For example, public
interest lawyers regularly charged the Reagan OMB with providing a conduit for off-the-record
communications from regulated industries to agency decisionmakers. See, ag., Houck, supra
note 14, at 542.
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interest groups that have not developed a dose relationship with the White
House. In the abstract, disclosure may encourage political accountability
for any preferential access OMB grants to well-connected representatives,1 2' but in reality, unless every aspect of the OMB review process is
thrown open to public scrutiny,12 secret channels for influencing OMB's
review will remain.12 For example, interest group representatives who
know key players on the White House staff may be able to channel input to
OMB through such staff members. In short, any program of regulatory
review that involves the White House and OMB will give "insiders" an
advantage, and such insiders usually represent focused interest groups
rather than the interests of the general public.
One might argue that concerns about secret conduits and insider
influence are overstated because all interest groups will get an opportunity
to make their views known and provide supporting data and analyses
2 4
during the subsequent notice and comment rulemaking proceeding.
Unfortunately, once a rule that reflects insider input is proposed, the
likelihood of the rulemaking proceeding allowing for true deliberation
about what best furthers statutory purposes is greatly decreased.lss

121. For discussions of the relation between secret White House communications and lack
of accountability for regulatory policy, see McGarity, supra note 8, at '457; Shapiro, supra note
17, at 22-23.
122. There are good reasons not to force OMB to make public all of its decision-making
processes, as that could discourage deliberation within the OMB, between OMB and the
White House, and ultimately within the White House itself. Se Gilhooley, supra note 92, at
336-40 (discussing the potential for disclosure of certain communications between OMB and
the reviewing agency to intrude on the executive deliberative process). Thus, even
commentators who advocate opening OMB review via some sort of sunshine laws focus
primarily on access to communications between OMB and the regulating agency; they would
allow communications between OMB and the White House, and within the White House itself
to remain in the shadows lest deliberative discussion within the executive be chilled. See Bruff,
supra note 74, at 516 (stating that executive privilege, grounded on the need for open
executive deliberation, does not justify prohibiting Congress to require disclosure of OMBagency communications); McGarity, supra note 8, at 487-88 (despite concerns about executive
privilege, accountability warrants Congress demanding disclosure of presidential communications with agencies regarding ongoing proceedings); Morrison, supra note 8, at 1071, 1072
(suggesting that Congress restrict all OMB involvement in agency rulemakings to on the
record comments); see also Gilhooley, supra note 92, at 322 (limiting disclosure even of 0MBagency communications "to allow free discussion and 'consultative privacy' in formulating
policy").
123. See Houck, supra note 14, at 542 n.42 (detailing numerous examples of OMB acting
as a conduit for industry information and noting that disclosure of industry contacts with
OMB have not cured the problem). There is also a possibility that OMB will simply ignore
policies limiting access to its staff members and requiring disclosure of outside communications, as apparentiy occurred under OMB director David Stockman early in the Reagan
administration. See Percival, supra note 2, at 151.
124. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988) (providing for notice and comment rulemaking). If the
agency makes policy outside of a notice and comment rulemaking, concerns about use of the
White House as a conduit for interest group information and influence become heightened.
125. OMB's potential interference with the deliberative structure of agency decisionmaking is even more egregious when OMB effectively prevents the agency from proposing a
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Interest groups excluded from the preliminary phase at which the
proposed rule is developed often will assume an antagonistic attitude
toward the entire agency proceeding. 126 Moreover, once the agency
proposes a rule that reflects some deal struck between OMB and powerful
presidential supporters, the agency is less likely to consider modifying the
rule. Modification in response to outsider comments would upset bargains
already struck. 1' In addition, the natural tendency of an agency that has
proposed a rule is to treat those who disagree with it as adversaries. 12" All
told, exclusion of interested entities from the process of 0MB influence on
proposed rules poses a serious risk of undermining the deliberative aspects
of notice and comment proceedings.
In addition, OMB regulatory review, unlike agency decision-making, is
not subject to judicial review.'2 Because judicial review helps check
against the government striking pure political deals aimed at generating
monopoly rents, 3 ' one might surmise that the lack of judicial review
would increase the propensity for OMB review to foster rent seeking."'
At one level this conclusion does not follow. To pass judicial muster,
the agency must justify its decision as a reasonable exercise of discretion in
light of the facts in the record, the legal standards governing the issue and

rule in the first place. Obviously, in such a situation there may be no opportunity for
"outsiders" to communicate their views to the agency. Cf.Morrison, supra note 8, at 1063,
1068 (arguing that OMB's secret influence on agency rulemaking gets more egregious as the
point of interference gets earlier in the rulemaking process, and especially taking issue with
OMB's effective ability to prevent an agency from investigating to decide whether action of
any sort is warranted).
126. See Seidenfeld, supra note 46, at 1560. Robert Reich has posited that much
antagonism stems from lawyers for interest groups taking sides once a rule is proposed in
order to preserve their positions and informational advantages in subsequent proceedings. See
Robert B. Reich, Regulation by Confrontation or Negotiation, 59 Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June
1981, at 82, 86-91.
127. See Seidenfeld, supra note 46, at 1558 n.235 (noting that agency intransigence
regarding rules proposed after negotiated rulemaking might deprive interest groups excluded
from the negotiations of an equal opportunity to influence the agency decision).
128. See Seidenfeld, supra note 46, at 1560.
129. Executive Orders authorizing OMB review have stated that such review is intended
merely to improve internal management of the executive branch, and for this reason have
clarified that the review program does not create any right to judicial review of agency rules.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 10, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,744 (1993); Exec. Order No. 12,291,
§ 9, 3 C.F.R. 133-34 (1982).
130. See Bruff, supra note 74, at 517 n.120; Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum.
L. Rev. 223, 251-56 (1986); Seidenfeld, supra note 46, at 1547; Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation
and the Hard Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 177, 211.
131. The term "monopoly rents" refers to undeserved benefits that the government can
bestow because of its monopoly on coercive regulation. The meaning is a generalization of
the term's original reference to the excess profits that entities in economic markets can earn
because the government has legally restricted or biased the workings of these markets. See
James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and'Profit Seeking, in Toward a Theory of the RentSeeking Society 3, 8-11 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980); George J. Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BellJ. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3, 3 (1971).
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the agency's previous related decisions 2 A reviewing court however,
can consider only the agency's publicly proffered bases for its final
decision and cannot probe the actual mental processes that led the
decision-maker to act. 33 Thus, whether an agency reaches a decision
because OMB imposed a political bargain on the agency will not affect
judicial review; the reviewing court will uphold the decision as long as the
agency can justify it after the fact. Said another way, OMB's influence is
subject to judicial review in the same way and to the same extent as any
other part of the agency decision-making process; if the decision OMB
seeks cannot be justified based both on the record and on acknowledged
statutory goals, the reviewing court will prevent OMB from imposing that
decision.
At another level, however, judicial review has more subtle effects on
agencies that may not extend to an outside participant in the decisionmaking process such as OMB. There is some evidence that agencies take
seriously judicial pronouncements that they are to act deliberatively and
consider all relevant factors in making their decisions.3 4 Especially at the
professional level, agency staff members often attempt in good faith to
comply with judicial pronouncements and to pursue the best means of
achieving their understanding of statutory goals. 13 Judicial review may
encourage deliberative decision-making aimed at the public interest by
delineating statutory goals in terms of some public-regarding purposes and
by instilling in agency staff an ethic of considering all factors relevant to an
evaluation of how best to achieve these goals.ss In these ways judicial

132. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983);
Brae Corp. V. United States, 740 F.2d 1023, 1038-39 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 130, at 18183; Patricia M. Wald, The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 Admin.
L. Rev. 507, 528 (1988).
133. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985); United States v.
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941).
134. See William F. Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 Yale L.J.
38, 60 (1975); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 1989 Duke L.J. 522, 527-28; see also R Shep Melnick, Regulation and the
Courts, The Case of the Clean Air Act 379 (1983) (criticizing the role of courts in
environmental law, but noting nonetheless thatjudicial review encourages analytical processes
and accountability to superiors within the EPA). But seejoseph L Saks, The (Unhappy) Truth
About NEPA, 26 Okla. L Rev. 239, 2399 (1973) (opining that requiring "articulation, detailed
findings or reasoned opinions" does not enhance the integrity or propriety of administrative
decisions).
135. See Seidenfeld, supra note 45, at nn.173-74.
136. See Pederson, supra note 134, at 60 (stating that the effects of rigorous judicial review
"serve as a precedent for future rule-writers and give those who care about well-documented
and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with which to move those who do not"). Richard
trying in good faith to
Pierce has criticized aggressive judicial review because agency staffs
follow judicial prescriptions will become demoralized by the contradictory signals they receive
from a decentralized judiciary. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial
Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the
1990s, 43 Admin. L Rev. 7, 23-27 (1991). Pierce's prediction that aggressive judicial review
would cause FERC to abandon its efforts to subject electric power generation to a competitive
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review helps
limit the propensity of agencies to succumb to interest group
1 7
pressure. 3
OMB, however, is not held directly responsible for a decision that is
later overturned; when a court reverses an agency decision it does not
directly tell OMB that it did not perform its job adequately. Moreover,
OMB staff members tend to be chosen more for their political ideology
than any professional expertise.) Hence, they are less likely to be
influenced by judicial pronouncements meant to reinforce a detailed
reasoning process in agency decision-making. The bottom line may be that
OMB review is structured to encourage rent-producing political deals
worked out behind closed doors and is not subject to the same subtle
influences of judicial review that mollify agency tendencies to adopt such
deals.

III. ANALYSIS OF A BIG PicrURE APPROACH To INFLUENCE OF AGENCY
POLICY
The second tenet of the "big picture" thesis asserts that a President
can effectively control agency policy and that resulting regulation is more
likely to further public purposes if the President uses a big picture
approach to influence agency decision-making rather than trying to
micromanage the agency. Commonly held perceptions regarding the
administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan suggest the
efficacy of the big picture approach. Each administration was known for
implementing an overarching policy perspective: For Roosevelt it was the
New Deal and its reliance on bureaucracy to correct injustices and
imperfections in economic markets;159 for Reagan it was getting

market, however, appears overstated. See generaloJim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review. The
Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility
Industry, 1994 Wisc. L. Rev. 763, 793-806 (demonstrating the inaccuracy of Pierce's thesis that
the hard look doctrine resulted in "regulatory paralysis at FERO"). One major problem with
Pierce's analysis is its failure to analyze separately the effects of remands on the grounds that
FERO failed to meet statutory requirements, which agencies cannot circumvent on remand. In
other words, the problems that have slowed FERC's movement to a market based system may
be more attributable to Congress's failure to amend outdated statutes than to the institutional
failings ofjudicial review. See Rossi, supra, at 786-87.
137. Although the role of agency staff is merely advisory, their control of information
within the agency, coupled with the need for agency heads to avoid alienating staff, allow the
staff to influence greatly final agency decisions. This is true to such an extent that often the
White House fears that agency heads are "captured" by agency staffs. SewJ. Clarence Davies,
Environmental Institutions and the Reagan Administration, in Environmental Policy in the
1980s: Reagan's New Agenda 144 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1984) (reporting
Reagan's mistrust of agency career civil servants exceeded that of previous presidents); James
Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It 50 (1989)
(noting Nixon's fears that liberal bureaucrats hired by Democratic administrations would
undermine his conservative policies); Maureen Dowd, Who's Environment Czar, EPA's Chief
or Sununu?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1990, at Al.
138. See Bruff, supra note 17, at 445, 557 (noting separately the political nature of OMB
appointees and the lack of experience of OIRA desk officers).
139. See Sidney M. Milkis, The Presidency, Policy Reform, and the Rise of Administrative
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government off the backs of business and restoring faith in markets as
superior to government regulators.1 4° Although observers strongly
disagree about the wisdom of each of these very different policy visions,
few would contest that both men were among the most effective presidents
at implementing their policies. They stand in sharp contrast, for instance,
to President Carter, who was known for getting involved in the nitty-gritty
of regulatory decisions1 4 ' and, not coincidentally, for the inability of his
The more rigorous
administration to put its policies into practice."
analysis below adds credence to this big picture hypothesis.

A. The Advantages of the Big PictureApbproach
Thus far this Article has argued that the President must exert a strong
influence on administrative policy if federal regulation is to be somewhat
coherent and aimed at furthering the interests of the general public. But,
allowing OMB to dictate the outcome of every major agency policy
decision is unlikely to achieve consistency with either the values of the
President or the polity that elected him. To maximize the benefits that
derive from the President's universal electoral accountability, the President
should identify some broad regulatory goals and consistently rely on them
to guide his regulatory actions. The use of such overarching goals will help
alleviate the President's cost of monitoring and policing agencies as well as
the public's costs of monitoring to prevent special interest regulation 4

Politics, in Remaking American Politics 146, 149-50 (Richard A. Harris & Sidney M. Milkis
eds., 1989); Robert L Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev.
1189, 1246 (1986); cf Nelson W. Poisby, Some Landmarks in Modem PresidentialCongressional Relations, in Both Ends of the Avenue: The Presidency, the Executive Branch,
and Congress in the 1980s, at 2-5 (Anthony King ed., 1983) (describing Roosevelt's
revolutionization of presidential-congressional relations as "reflect[ing] a taste for the big
picture, a preference for assertedly broader, as contrasted with narrower, interests").
140. See Hugh Hedo, One Executive Branch or Many?, in Both Ends of the Avenue 26, 43
(Anthony King ed., 1983).
141. See Paul C. Light, The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to
Reagan 221 (rev. ed. 1991) (noting President Carter's misplaced penchant for the details of
policy); Nathan, supra note 9, at 87; see also Hargrove & Nelson, supra note 117, at 117
(criticizing Carter for trying to solve all problems at once instead of setting priorities).
Although it is difficult to measure the extent to which a President involves the White House
in regulatory detail, Paul Light has noted that Carter issued many more executive orders than
his predecessors, in part because of his tendency to engage in "administrative tinkering."
Light, supra, at 116.
142. See Light, supra note 141, at 221 (criticizing President Carter's focus on policy details
for leaving "the domestic agenda without broad guidance").
143. See Hedo, supra note 140, at 35 (arguing that a president must impose a "grand
simplification" if he is to effectuate his personal policy vision); see also Hess, supra note 73, at
10-11 (1976) (arguing that because the demands of running the executive exceed the
capabilities of any one person to manage, the President should restrict his role to "chief
political officer," which entails making "a relatively small number of highly significant political
decisions"); Robinson, supra note 74, at 106 (noting that the power of the president as "chief
political officer" is exercised "by setting general policy ideals and goals that loyal aides
transmit successively through the executive establishment").
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1. Defining OverarchingGoals as a Means of Decreasingthe President's
Monitoring Costs
The use of overarching goals would decrease the President's
monitoring costs in several ways. First, it would help the President structure
executive review of agency action in a manner that would constraOin MB
staff members from injecting their idiosyncratic values into the policysetting process. Second, it would guide the President in choosing agency
heads likely to agree with him on the outcome of major decisions. Third, it
would aid the President in establishing a successful legislative agenda
regarding regulatory matters. Finally, it would increase the likelihood that
courts reviewing agency policy decisions would act consistently' with the
President's regulatory values.
As already noted, a major difficulty with OMB review of agenicy policy
is the slack that OIRA desk officers who perform the initial review
necessarily enjoy.14 Unless the President or personally dose advisors
carefully monitor the interaction of desk officers with agency personnel,
there is no way to ensure that these officers advocate the President's
regulatory goals. Even a well-meaning desk officer may have difficulty
internalizing these goals unless the administration dearly spells out its
policy priorities.'4 The statement of broad policy
goals would thus help
1
guide OMB reviewers in performing their jobs.'
In addition, such a statement would facilitate ultimate presidential
oversight of the influence OIRA staff exercises in discussing a proposed
regulation with the promulgating agency. For example, when an agency
proposes a regulation, the Director of OMB might require each initial
reviewer to explain in writing her concerns in terms of the administration's
announced policy goals.1 4 This would enable higher level OMB monitors
144. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
145. As one White House staff member explained: "Since I never knew what decision the
president would make, or would have made if an issue ever got to him, I had no choice but to
pursue my own vision of what was good." Marc K Landy, et al., The Environmental Protection
Agency: Asking the Wrong Questions 67 (1990); cf Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers
64 (1977) (noting that fragmentation of executive policy decision-making makes it "vastly
more difficult to arrive at mutual understandings and to agree on courses of action [that
implement the President's perspective]").
146. According to some accounts, internalized goals are very important in getting a
subordinate to pursue effectively a superior's commands. See William G. Outhi, Markets,
Bureaucracies, and Clans, 25 Admin. Sci. Q. 129, 131-32 (1980);Joyce Rothschild-Whitt, The
Collectivist Organization: An Alternative to Rational-Bureaucratic Models, 44 Am. Soc. Rev.
509, 513-14 (1979).
147. Such a written explanation will have the effect of encouraging desk officers to think
hard about how their objections match up with presidential priorities and will deter objections
that cannot be justified in terms of those priorities. Cf Shapiro, supra note 17, at 28-29 &
n.193 (proposing a requirement that the White House issue a written justification when it
returns a proposed rule to an agency as a means of ensuring accountability); Bruff, supra note
17, at 586 (noting that a paper trail of OMB's interaction with an agency may sacrifice some
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to understand how the initial reviewer perceived the President's regulatory
goals and to flag OIRA staff input to the promulgating agency that might
not comport with the President's regulatory vision. Moreover, communicating to the agency an OIRA reviewer's concerns, stated in terms of
announced presidential goals, gives the agency a chance to rebut the OMB
statement. Such a focused OMB/agency dialogue would encourage the
agency to directly seek to achieve the President's regulatory vision, 48 and
help to identify those regulations that warrant attention by the President
himself at an early stage of the agency's regulatory action.
In addition to helping structure the executive review process, using a
big picture approach may aid the President in appointing agency heads in
4
1
a manner that minimizes the need for OMB review of agency decisions.
Appointment of high-level agency officials who share the President's
overarching goals, or at least those relevant to the decisions of the
particular agency, will help reduce monitoring costs. If the President is
successful in finding individuals who share his basic values to staff the top
positions in an agency, he need not monitor every agency decision. He can
trust that in most cases the agency will decide the matter as he would
have"4 In essence, he will have spread the costs of monitoring agency
staff among those in high-level agency positions, thereby dividing the
monitoring task into manageable workloads. Moreover, because the
monitoring is done by those inside the agency, it is less likely to engender
resentment and resistance by agency staff.'51 Theoretically, reliance on

candor but "can be expected to ensure that their interchange [stays] within legal limits").
148. "Stating directives [to subordinates] in terms of [superiors'] primary goals" may be
"one technique that can be used to generate a countervailing dynamic [to the subordinates'
predispositions] ... that tends toward the achievement of the real goal." Rubin supra note 43,
at 413 (discussing how stating statutory goals might help Congress control agency
implementation of statutes that grant polic)-making discretion). Stated more abstractly,
elevating a set of particufar constraints on decision-making to goals changes the outcome
chosen from the feasible set of outcomes to emphasize that set of constraints. See Herbert A.
Simon, On the Concept of Organizational Goal, 9 Admin. Sd. Q. 1, 8-9 (1964).
149. The President's authority to appoint agency heads and their immediate assistants
provides perhaps the most significant source of presidential power over both executive and
independent agencies. See Richard Pierce et al., Administrative Law and Process 79 (2d ed.
1992); Robinson, supra note 74 at 107; Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and
Presidential Administration, 26 Am.J. Pol. Sc. 197, 200 (1982); Peter L Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government Sepgration of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
573, 589-91 (1984).
150. The Reagan Administration applied a big picture approach to many of its appointments, choosing its agency heads on the basis of their beliefs in regulatory relief rather than
their expertise. See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 5; Waterman, supra note 9, at 171, 173; see also
Walter Williams, Mismanaging America: The Rise of the Anti-Analytic Presidency 84 (1990)
(acknowledging but criticizing this approach to appointments because it lead to incompetent
and Inflexible high-level agency officials).
151. This leaves the possibility that the agency head will be "captured" by his staff, which
can control the flow of information and the analyses that reach the agency head to bias her
decisionmaking. See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 6; see also DeMuth and Ginsburg, supra note 7,

at 1085 (detailing how agency mechanisms may commit the agency to a proposed rule before
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agency heads to make the right decisions, rather than on direct oversight,
sacrifices the President's ability to decide every major policy issue in the
manner he would like. In practice, however, the President forfeits little
because pragmatically the President cannot dictate every, or even many, of
the major policy choices made by agencies.
There remain, however, the monitoring costs to ensure that political
appointees at the top levels of agencies share the President's broad goals.
Again, the big picture approach reduces these costs. The President's
overarching theme provides a coherent philosophy that facilitates an
evaluation of whether an appointee -will be loyal to the President.53 In
addition, monitoring of appointees need occur only at the time of
appointment, which is relatively infrequent. Moreover, such monitoring
requires a background check of the appointee instead of the vast technical
inquiry needed to review an agency policy decision directly. Hence the
President has greater capability to participate personally in the
appointment process than in directly overseeing agency policy. Thus, the
costs of monitoring appointments are not likely to be as great as those of
monitoring agency decisions directly.
A big picture approach to regulatory policy might also aid the
President in persuading Congress to adopt his regulatory legislative
agenda. An announced overarching theme that carries over from the
presidential campaign signls the President's legislative priorities to
Congress.s To the extent that overarching policy themes are salient to
voters, a President who introduces such themes in his campaign can also
claim an electoral mandate to pursue them.' This would allow a
President to increase pressure on Congress to enact legislative changes
consistent with the President's overall policy goals.
A big picture approach may also influence courts to construe statutes
consistently with the President's announced policy goals and generally to
uphold agency policy decisions that further those goals. If, as noted above,
the President can obtain legislation purporting to further such goals,
the agency head is even aware of it). But, "capture" of reviewers outside the agency can occur

for the same reasons if the reviewers too depend on information and analyses provided by
agency staff, See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.

152. As one leading scholar of presidential control of the federal bureaucracy has phrased
it, "no president can cope with more than a tiny fraction of the decisionmaking in
government." Heclo, supra note 145, at 2.
153. See Hedo, supra note 140, at 45.
154. Big picture approach thereby aids the President in meeting two of the most

important criteria for ensuring a successful legislative agenda. acting quickly to propose an
agenda, and setting definite legislative priorities. See Light, supra note 141, at 218-19, 230-31.
155. The perception of an electoral mandate is one component of a President's capital. See
Light, supra note 141, at 28-29 (discussing the effects of public approval and electoral margin
on presidential capital). Whether elections actually reflect any policy mandates remains a
controversial question. See George C. Edwards I & Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential
Leadership: Politics and Policy Making 83-84, 95-96 (1985); Wattenberg, supra note 114, at
128-29.
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reviewing courts are more likely to interpret statutory provisions that
govern agency action consistently with the President's regulatory values. 55
Even if an agency decision is challenged on grounds other than that it
violates the agency's authorizing statute, a court is more likely to uphold it
if the agency has tied that decision to the pursuit of the President's
announced overarching policy vision. In reviewing agency action, courts
look for logical reasoning and consistency, 57 and they are more apt to
find these traits in a set of decisions which are analytically based on a
coherent regulatory perspective.
2. A Big Picture Approach as a Means of Decreasingthe Likelihood of
Special-Interest-OrientedRegulation
Because a big picture approach to presidential influence of agency
policy-setting may be more politically salient, it might also help check
against the President using his influence to hand out regulatory plums in
return for political support from powerful special interest groups. When
voting for President, individuals are more likely to consider broad policy
themes than to consider particular regulatory policy decisions.16a
Although the electorate is unlikely to vote out a President who engages in
piecemeal distribution of largess to various special interest groups, it may
refuse to elect a candidate whose entire domestic program is seen as
favoring particular special interest groups. Of course, the big picture
approach will not eliminate special-interest-oriented regulation; no
administrable regulatory system could guarantee that. But at least the big
picture approach maximizes the likelihood of political accountability
discouraging such regulation.
156. Traditionally, courts have interpreted statutes to further the purposes underlying
them. See William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes
and the Creation of Public Policy 571 (1988); see also Henry Hart &Albert Sachs, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1144-47 (tent. ed. 1958)
(advocating this approach to interpretation). The recent trend of some judges to limit their
considerations solely to statutory text-the so called "New Textualism'---would limit the effect
of legislative history tying the statutory purpose to the President's policy vision. See William N.
Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.Rev. 621, 624 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, From the
Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 Minn. L.Rev.
241, 256 (1992). The New Textualism, however, is not the universal or even dominant mode
of judicial statutory interpretation. Se Eskridge, supra, at 621 (asserting that the new
textuallsm is a challenge to the predominate traditional mode of judicial interpretation);
Frickey, supra, at 256 (claiming that with respect to mode of statutory interpretation, "[T]he
Supreme Court remains up for grabs.")
157. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
158. See Polsby & Wildavsky, supra note 115, at 7 (stating that most voters consider only
major Issues, and even those only in a rudimentary way). It may be that voters consider only
their beliefs about a candidate's performance and do not consider policy at all. See
Wattenberg, supra note 114, at 154-55. Nonetheless, even Wattenberg concedes that during
the 1980s the public's policy preferences included a desire for less federal regulation, id. at
103-04, which President Reagan made a centerpiece of his presidential campaigns. See Heclo,
supra note 140, at 43; Light, supra note 141, at 243.
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B. Potential Objections to a Big Picture Approach
Opponents of increased presidential control of agency policy might
object to a big picture approach on several grounds. First they might argue
that the big picture approach permits the President to abrogate Congress's
lawmaking supremacy.'- 9 Although the Constitution's choice of a unitary
executive and its assignment of responsibility to the President to see that
the laws are faithfully executed implies that the President must have
significant means to influence agency policy, 16e the implication need not
include the authority to specify regulatory philosophies and priorities that
bind the agency in the same way as statutory prescriptions. Critics might
contend that formal specifications would essentially permit the President to
amend statutes unilaterally, thereby undermining the policy choices
Congress made when it adopted the statute."'
Whether the President micromanages agency policy or uses a big
picture approach, the legislative supremacy of Congress binds agencies to
comply with statutes that govern their authority to regulate.162 Usually,
this still leaves agencies broad discretion in actually fashioning rules
because in a particular situation statutory directives often do not determine
the regulatory outcome; statutes leave gaps for the agency to fill.

6s

In

filling these gaps, the agency itself will have to bring extra-statutory
judgment to bear-judgment such as how to balance the factors that
Congress explicitly made relevant, or what additional factors to consider
when those Congress specified do not permit a reasonable resolution of
the issue.16 As long as the President limits his influence to the agencies'
gap-filling judgment and does not cause the agency to countermand valid
statutory directives, he does not usurp Congress's lawmaking supremacy;16" Congress remains free to overrule the President's influence by
159. Cf McGarity, supra note 8, at 454-56 (criticizing OMB review as it has historically
been practiced for allowing the President and OMB "to steer an agency away from its
congressional mandate").
160. See Gilhooley, supra note 92, at 309; Strauss, supra note 149, at 597; Paul Verkuil,
Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 Colum. L. Rev.
943, 957 (1984).
161. The history of OMB review, especially under Presidents Reagan and Bush, has led
critics to level this very criticism at the Reagan regulatory review program. See Morrison, supra
note 8, at 1062-63.
162. Thus even the highly controversial Executive Order 12,291, which imposed a costbenefit requirement, recognized that it could not thereby overrule statutory constraints on
agency rulemalcing the Order explicitly limited this requirement to the extent permitted by
law. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982).
163. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (describing a situation in which a statute left a policy decision to agency rulemaking as
a statutory gap).
164. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
165. See Percival, supra note 2, at 199; see also McGarity, supra note 8, at 454-55 (noting
that agencies have broad discretion under statutes and that because the President can push

80

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1994]

statutorily filling the gap. Therefore, any criticism that the big picture
approach violates the vesting of legislative power in Congress has validity
only to the extent that this approach, more than micromanagement, invites
the President improperly to encourage agencies to overstep their role and
undermine Congress's statutory mandates."' 6 In fact, the opposite is true.
Under the big picture approach, when an agency considers a
regulation to address some perceived problem, the agency is still
responsible for applying the statute and the President's stated priorities to
the particular problem. In contrast, when the White House engages in
micromanagement, it can both specify the nonstatutory factors that it
believes to be relevant and second-guess the agency's application of these
factors. Because of the professional rather than political ethic, of the
agency staff and the relative openness of its decision-making process,16
the agency is less likely than OMB surreptitiously to inflate the importance
of the President's priorities to such an extent that these priorities overrule
statutory prescriptions. Hence, once one acknowledges the need for some
presidential oversight of agency policy, concerns about presidential
undermining of statutory objectives suggest that a big picture approach is
preferable.
A second, related objection asserts that the President exceeds his
constitutional authority by specifying binding criteria to guide agency
policy because he displaces the agency as the body that Congress
authorized to issue the final rule.'6 Congress undoubtedly can authorize
officers other than the President to promulgate enforceable regulations;
the President does not have the authority to override such regulatory
decisions directly."' 9 Presidential specification, however, of a general
outlook and a set of priorities to guide such officers in exercising their
regulatory discretion is not the same as having the President determine the
final regulation. The President's criteria for regulation must be evaluated
in the context of a particular set of circumstances before they have a
agencies as close to statutorily defined lines as possible, there is a tension between review by
the President and relevant congressional committees).
166. As Harold Bruff has noted. "All executive [review] has the potential for straying
beyond legal limits.... The question concerning [any particular review program] is whether
[it places] an undue strain on fidelity to statutory requirements." Bruff, supra note 17, at 562.

167. See Seidenfeld, supra note 46, at 1555, 1559-60.
168. See Houck, supra note 14, at 554.

169. See supra note 14. If the decision is made by the head of an executive agency the
President can threaten to remove the decision-maker with the intent of replacing her with
one who will do as the President desires. But the authority to replace the decision-maker is
quite different from the authority to make the decision. There are significant costs involved in
replacing an agency head: The President may like the job the agency head is doing with
respect to other matters, the President may not be able to get Senate approval for a
replacement who will do his bidding, and removal of an agency head is a high-profile event
that may cost the President significant popular support. See Strauss, supra note 149, at 590-91;
Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 200-01. In addition, as the law presently stands, for
decisions by independent regulatory agencies, the President does not even have the authority
to remove the decision-makers. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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bearing on decisions regarding whether and how to regulate. As long as
the agency still has the responsibility for assessing how the specified
priorities apply to a particular proposed regulation, the President is not
dictating to the agency precisely how to fashion its rules.170
Nonetheless, specification of a binding regulatory philosophy will
constrain the agency from structuring regulations as it otherwise might
have. Indeed, that is the very reason for the President issuing the
specification. The big picture approach dearly envisions the President
substituting his judgment for that of the agency with respect to some of the
component decisions that must be made when an agency promulgates
regulations. Thus, the question raised by this objection is whether the
President encroaches on the legitimate constitutional prerogatives of
Congress when he substitutes his judgment about regulatory philosophy
and priorities for that of the agency head whom the statute has authorized
to promulgate the regulations.
The original justification for allowing Congress to isolate agency
discretion from presidential influence was a belief that the expertise of
agencies would enable them to find the best solutions to the problems
their regulations addressed.' 7 ' Along with this optimism about the
capabilities of technical knowledge to solve regulatory problems came a
concern that political pressure would divert the expert agency from
focusing on what is technically best to focusing on what would appease
elected legislators and officials to whom an agency head may feel
beholden. 72 This, expertise rationale justified a broad prohibition on
political influence of agency policy.
By the early 1970s, the expertise foundation for the administrative
state had crumbled.'7 Students of the bureaucracy recognized that the
professionalism of agency staffs was not sufficient to keep them from
delivering benefits to special interest groups. 74 It is not that expertise is
irrelevant. For many agency decisions, however, expertise merely clarifies
the regulatory options available and their potential ramifications. 75 The

170. Cf. Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 201 (arguing that due to the breadth of
agency discretion in applying the requirement that regulations be cost-beneficial under
Executive Order 12,291, that order does not give the President ultimate power to dictate
regulations).
171. See Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission 51 (1955);
James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 23-24 (1938); DanielJ. Gifford, The New Deal
Regulatory Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 299, 306-07

(1983).
172. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 183.
173. See Breyer, supra note 25, at 351; Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in
Administrative Law, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 567, 583 (1992).
174. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L
Rev. 1667, 1684-85 (1975).
175. See Bernstein, supra note 171, at 258-59 (1955); Louis B. Schwartz, Legal Restrictions
of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication ofJudicial Responsibility, 67 Harv.
L. Rev. 436, 472-73 (1954).
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ultimate choice of particular regulations requires value judgments that
cannot be made by application of expertise but rather are more suited to
resolution by political processes.7 6
The rejection of the expertise model does not necessarily mean that
regulatory decisions should be subject to direct political oversight, as would
occur if the President could micromanage agency decisions to promulgate
particular regulations. According to some accounts, in addition to
agencies' expertise, their place within the federal government, their
structure, and their decision-making processes make them institutions
capable of resolving regulatory disputes by deliberation aimed at seeking
consensus about regulatory options.'77 This rationale justifies Congress
vesting ultimate decision-making authority in agencies, but it does not
justify the strict prohibitions on political influence that follow from the
expertise model. The agency must be held accountable to the desires of
the electorate, especially for agency decisions that hinge on value
judgments!7 Mechanisms that increase this accountability should be
welcomed as long as they do not interfere with the deliberative processes
by which the agency reaches its decision, or other measures that ensure the

agency acts within statutory bounds.
The big picture approach to influencing agency policy meets these
criteria. An overarching regulatory theme tends to reflect a philosophy of
government which in turn derives from a value choice rather than a
technical assessment of the effects of particular proposed regulations. The
nature of overarching themes thus makes them the components of agency
policy-setting most appropriately subject to political control. 79 Moreover,
176. SeeJames 0. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 Admin. L Rev.
363, 372-73 (1976); Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 183; Werhan, supra note 173, at 58384.
177. See Seidenfeld, supra note 46, at 1542; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 63-64 (1985) (arguing that doctrines of
administrative law can best be understood as facilitating a deliberative role for agencies). The
rejection of the expertise model of agencies does not necessarily lead one to subscribe to the
view that I espouse here, which sees agencies' role as facilitating deliberative democratic
decision.making. One could instead adopt a pluralistic outlook that views agencies' role as the
facilitation of pure political deals between interest groups. See generally Stewart, supra note 174
(describing and critiquingjudidal attempts to create a theory of interest group representation
as a means of legitimating agency action). Under the pluralist model of the administrative
state, presidential control serves to discourage political deals that are inefficient and to
coordinate such deals so they do not impose conflicting obligations on entities subject to the
resulting regulations. Hence, I would expect one who subscribes to this theory to support
stronger presidential control over agency policy such as the control that results in theory from
presidential mtcromanagement. See, e.g., DeMuth 8 Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 1080-82.
Elsewhere I have described some of the weaknesses of the pluralistic view and explained why I
prefer to subscribe to the model premised on deliberative democracy. Seidenfeld, supra note
46, at 1523-27, 1533-36.
178. Sea Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 184; see also Shapiro, supra note 17, at 20
("[Olverslght by generalists is more likely to improve the rationality of regulatory policy when
It supplies the general preferences or values that an agency should follow.").
179. See Strauss 8 Sunstein, supra note 10, at 184 (identifying resolution of issues of value
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unlike micromanagement, the big picture approach need not short-circuit
the deliberative discussions that might occur as part of the agency
proceedings. Because the agency gets to make the final decision, it must
still be allowed to conduct its rulemaking proceedings and it must still
explain how its final decision follows reasonably from the governing
statutes and the record before it' Finally, as discussed earlier, by
encouraging regulatory policy to be set in accordance with the President's
publicly announced regulatory vision, the big picture approach increases
the saliency of presidential influence and may thereby increase the
accountability of the 'value choice" component of agency policysetting.' 8' In short, once the political nature of agency policy-setting is
conceded, viewing agencies as a means of fostering deliberative democracy
would seem to authorize the President to coordinate and control the
regulatoiy philosophy underlying agency policies, but not to evaluate the
circumstances surrounding particular proposed regulations or to make the
ultimate policy decision.
One legal scholar, Harold Bruff has raised another objection that
goes more to the heart of the big picture approach. Bruff has expressed
concern about presidential "macromanagement" because "[t]he
information necessary to make coherent centralized decisions about society
as a whole simply does not exist, as the Soviets so consistently demonstrate. " ' 82 Bruff seems generally to prefer micromanagement, which he
defines as addressing regulation on a case by case basis. 83 With respect to
macromanagement of regulatory policy, he asserts that most questions "can
be settled only by Congress, through legislation, and even then quite
imperfectly." '4

Much of Bruff's concern about the limited abilities of centralized
decision-making is legitimate, but his analysis of the limits on such abilities
applies with greater force to centralized micromanagement and overstates
the case against a big picture approach. Centralized decision-making poses
several problems. The lack of information about particular situations makes
it impossible for central decision-makers to take into account unique
factors that distinguish one situation that warrants a regulatory response
from another.8 - Changing centrally defined criteria also takes significant
as one of three central components of "reasoned dedsionmaking").
180. For an agency to survive a challenge that its decision was arbitrary and capricious, see
5 U.S.C. § 706(A) (1992), the agency must meet the "hard look" test as adopted by the
Supreme Court in Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983). This test essentially requires an agency to explain in detail how the means it has
chosen relate to statutorily prescribed ends in order to flush out impermissible bases for
regulatory action. See Sunstein, supra note 177, at 61.
181. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
182. Bruff, supra note 17, at 540.
183. Id. at 540-42.
184. Id. at 542.
185. See Thomas Sowell, Knowledge & Decisions 26 (1980) (noting that informal decisions
can be applied "in a more specific or 'fine tuned' fashion" because they tend to be
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time and energy."' 6 Thus, centrally made decisions tend to lack the
substantive and temporal fluidity that are needed for efficient regulation. 187 Decentralized decision-making, however, poses problems as well.
Government decision-makers do not operate under the guidance of the
invisible hand of a competitive market, and monitoring decentralized
decision-making for abuse is very costly ' In addition, decentralized
decision-making can result in uncoordinated and even conflicting
regulation.'
Efficient regulation thus requires balancing the inflexibility
of central decision-making against the costs of monitoring and lack of
coordination imposed by decentralized decision-making.
This balancing explains why big picture goals should be made by an
accountable central institution, such as the President, and less encompassing decisions about how best to structure particular regulations by the less
centrally organized agencies, which have better access to information and
expertise. The costs due to inflexibility of central decision-making pose a
significant threat when broad policy perspectives are applied to particular
problems whose parameters might vary from one another, that is, when
specific regulations are designed. The setting of broad perspectives is not
as sensitive to the critique of inflexibility because particular circumstances
can be taken into account when the broad perspectives are applied and
specific regulations adopted.'
In contrast, the benefit- of central
decision-making-better coordination and easier monitoring-are more
important for decisions that cut broadly across the regulatory horizon than
for decisions regarding design of particular regulations. Therefore,
although the problem of insufficient information for flexible central

"incremental," "individualized" and "episodic"); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 153, 156 (1988) (asserting that
high Information costs of centralized decisionmaking lead to uniformity and hence
inflexibility).
186. See Sowell, supra note 185, at 23 (noting that informal decisions can be made with
less devotion of resources).
187. See Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. Chi. L Rev. 335, 343 (1990).
188. Cf. Sowell, supra note 185, at 30-31 (noting that informal decision-making imposes
risk costs when individuals affected by a decision cannot trust the decision-maker to take their
Interests into account). I am assuming here that Bruff's objection to macromanagement is not
merely a statement about the relative benefits of markets versus government regulation. If a
competitive market exists to control the allocation of resources and there is no concern about
the fairness of the resulting allocation, there is no need for regulation. But often markets are
plagued by externalities and information cost problems that justify regulation. My response to
Bruff assumes that we are considering a situation in which regulation is warranted and the
issue is how (not whether) to regulate.
189. This is one of the strongest arguments for presidential influence over agency policysetting In the first place. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 447-48; supra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 189-90.
190. Cf Simon, supra note 148, at 17-18 (broad goals are usually made at higher, more
centralized levels of an organization, and centralized goals provide a tolerable constraint
because subsidiary decisions are constantly being made at lower levels to take into account
particular circumstances).
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regulation is real, it is much more significant for the micromanagement of
particular regulations than it is for the choice of an overarching regulatory
vision.
Bruff's analogy to the procrustean central decision-making apparatus
of the former Soviet Union supports this analysis. The ineffectiveness of
the Soviet system stemmed less from its reliance on central decision-makers
to set national priorities than from its refusal to rely on markets to direct
economic production and allocation, and its insistence on a detailed
central prescription to implement those priorities."' In other words, the
Soviet system was plagued by central micromanagement. This is not to suggest
that the Soviets had a good system for choosing broad national goals.
Certainly the choice to make the USSR into a military superpower at the
expense of satisfying consumer demand, in the long run, proved
unwise. 2 Such big picture choices, however, were unacceptable because
the Soviet government was not responsive to the desires of the populous,
not because these choices were centrally fade. The big picture approach
advocated here, in contrast, would make central decisions more salient
and, given the democratic structure of our government, more accountable.
Although the President too could err by choosing a regulatory philosophy
that was not supported by the electorate, given the political accountability
built into the American system of government, it is doubtful that the errors
would be as egregious or long-lived as those of the Soviet government.
IV. EVALUATION OF CURRENT EXECUTIVE REGULATORY REVIEW

Thus far, this Article has discussed the big picture approach to
presidential oversight in abstract and general terms. It has glossed over
many of the details of how a President might structure his influence of
agency policy to comport with this approach. The Article has done so with
good reason because the approach outlined is not so well developed that it
dictates a particular mechanism for presidential influence. Nonetheless, it
does imply certain constraints on such mechanisms, and an exploration of
these constraints will help to flesh out the meaning of the big picture
approach.
As a means for discussing the detailed implications of the big picture
approach, this Article will use the approach to analyze the current
program for presidential influence over agency policy. The task of applying
the approach to evaluate the current regulatory-review program is

191. See A.F. Dowlah, Soviet Political Economy in Transition: From Lenin to Gorbachev
190 (1992); Peter Rutland, The Politics of Economic Stagnation in the Soviet Union: The
Role of Local Party Organs in Economic Management 10 (1994); cf Paul Marer, Roadblocks
to Changing Economic Systems in Eastern Europe, in From Socialism.to Market Economy.
The Transition Problem 9, 14-17 (William S. Kern ed., 1992) (reviewing "common causal
factors in successful market economies" without any mention of decentralized setting of
government priorities).
192. See F.N. Klotzwog, Anatomy of the Crisis, 3 Current Pol. & Econ. of Russia 1, 2
(1992).
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particularly timely because President Clinton recently modified the
program that Presidents Reagan and Bush had instituted.' 95 In large part,
Clinton's changes respond to severe criticism of the Reagan-Bush program
by public interest groups and many in Congress.'" What remains to be
seen is whether Clinton's program will provide the benefits of presidential
oversight of agency policy without generating the detriments attributable to
executive micromanagement of such policy.
A. The Needfor OMB Regulatory Review
Although President Clinton significantly modified OMB regulatory
review, he retained the central concept of having OMB preview particular
agency decisions and communicate its concerns to the agency outside of
notice and comment proceedings. 9' Given the problems of interference
with particular agency decisions, the first question raised by the big picture
approach is whether any such OMB review program is justified.
The big picture approach recognizes that the President must not only
define overarching policy themes, but also that he must have a mechanism
for monitoring agency compliance with those themes. Nonetheless, the
preferred mechanisms for implementing the big picture approach are
through a coherent legislative agenda and the appointment of agency
heads who share the President's regulatory vision. Unfortunately, these
mechanisms by themselves may not be up to the task of constraining
"runaway" bureaucracies within agencies.
The cumbersome process of enacting legislation interferes with the
President's ability to get his legislative agenda through Congress much as it
hinders direct congressional control of agency policy-setting.'96 A
President has a limited amount of political capital he can use to press for a
legislative agenda, and precious little time to get his agenda enacted.1
These constraints prevent the President from marshalling through
Congress all but a handful of statutory provisions reflecting his policy

193. See Exec. Order No. 12,866,58 Fed Reg. 51,735.
194. See Stephen Barr, White House Shifts Role in Rule-Making; Clinton Seeks to End
Closed-Door Process, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1993, at Al; John H. Cushman, Jr. President Moves
to Loosen Grip of White House on Regulations, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1993, at A16. The ReaganBush review program had prompted threats by the House Appropriations Committee to strike
the appropriation for OMB oversight of rulemaking. See Judith Havemann, House Moves to
Wipe Out OMB Unit: Review Staff Accused of "Second Guessing" Agencies, Wash. Post, July
31, 1986, at A23. An impasse was avoided by OMB agreeing to some disclosure and
restrictions on its ability to act as a conduit for ex-parte comments to agencies. See Percival,
supra note 2, at 171 8- n.259. Congressional hostility to OMB review continued however,
prompting the Senate to refuse to process President Bush's nomination to head OIRA unless
the President agreed to certain restrictions on OIRA's actions. See Delissa Ridgway et al., The
Council on Competitiveness And Regulatory Review. A "Kinder, Gentler" Approach to
Regulation?, 6 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 691, 698 (1993).
195. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,742.
196. See Light, supra note 141, at 53-54.
197. See Id. at 33-34, 36.
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vision. Although such provisions, if carefully crafted, can significantly alter
the perspectives with which agencies and courts view regulation, such
judicial and administrative reaction is not likely to occur quickly. Even
after such reaction occurs, a substantial legacy of existing regulatory policy
will still be intact.
In addition, the propensity of congressional committees to engage in
special-interest-oriented oversight might seriously undercut presidential
efforts to implement regulatory reform through legislation.I On any
proposed regulatory measure, the President could face opposition from
powerful committee members whose ability to modify and kill legislation is
well-documented.1 This is not meant to deny that the President has
significant power that he can use to bring aspects of his legislative agenda
to fruition. The President's ability to focus media attention on an issue, his
power to bestow benefits on the constituents of members of Congress who
support his agenda, and his potential to deliver votes in congressional
elections increase the likelihood of legislative success for particular
programs.m Repeated use of such tactics, however, will impose economic
costs on society and concomitantly consume the President's political
capital. 20 ' At some point the price to the President for pushing legislation
through Congress exceeds the benefit he derives from doing so. Thus, a
President would be unwise to rely too heavily on legislative changes to
implement his policy vision.
As for legislative enactments, there are pragmatic limitations on the
extent to which the President can rely on appointments of agency officials
to guarantee compliance with his overarching policies. The need for
Senate approval of appointments is one obvious constraint on such
reliance. °2 Although this has not been a great obstacle to appointments
by most modem Presidents, 203 adverse publicity during Senate confirma-

198. See Maass, supra note 56, at 41-42.
199. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 110, at 56; David E. Price, Congressional Committees
in the Policy Process, in Congress Reconsidered 156, 156-58 (Lawrence C. Dodd 8&Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 2d ed. 1981); Seidman, supra note 64, at 45; see also R. Douglas Arnold,
The Logic of Congressional Action 108 (1990) (discussing the need for one outside the
legislature who seeks adoption of a particular policy, such as the President, to find committee

chairs willing to back his proposals).
200. See Edwards & Wayne, supra note 155, at 130, 327, 335-38 (discussing the President's
ability to stage a media event, to get legislators elected on his coattails, and to grant benefits
to legislators and their constituents as means of influencing public opinion and Congress).
201. See Edwards & Wayne, supra note 155, at 336 (noting that because capital is scarce, a
President cannot squander it by striking frequent bargains with members of Congress).

202. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
203. Members of Congress ordinarily believe that the President is entitled to appoint
whomever he wants, and Senate confirmation of appointees is usually routine. But when an
appointment effects the "electoral or policy concerns" of congress-persons, then Senators may

withhold their confirmation vote. Until very recently, however, the most the Senate could do
was to delay regulatory appointments or to bargain for concessions on future appointments in
return for confirmation. See Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., Signals from the Hill: Congressional
Oversight and the Challenge of Social Regulation 77-79 (1988); see also Jonathan R. Macey,
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tion hearings recently seems to have given the Senate significant influence
over some presidential appointments.2 ° In addition, the President may
not be able to appoint agency heads who share his regulatory agenda
because he may need those appointments to serve other purposes.
"Because politics has to do... with fashioning compromises and repaying
debts, a president or department head may not be able to come within
20 5
hailing distance of his first choice for a political appointment."
Rewards for political support from powerful interest groups often will
override ideology as a basis for an agency appointment.
Another constraint on the appointment process stems from the need
for high-level agency officials to know something about the programs they
head and about the means of getting results in Washington. Loyal but
incompetent appointees cannot effectively press a President's regulatory
agenda.0 6 In addition, high-level agency officials who fail to gain the
respect of their staffs and Congress may find themselves forced to comply
with detailed and inflexible policy prescriptions written into statutes, or to
regulate without the cooperation of staff, upon whom they must rely to
provide the analytic support for their decisions. For example, President
Reagan's appointment of an EPA administrator who knew little and cared
less about the environment may have been a significant factor prompting
more detailed congressional oversight of the EPA, which in the long run
has made the agency's regulatory task more difficlt. 07

Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War over Administrative Agencies,
80 Geo. LJ. 671, 699 (1992) (noting and criticizing the Senate's propensity to accept
regulatory nominees).
204. In particular, adverse publicity prompted President Clinton to withdraw the
nominations of, among others, Zoe Baird for Attorney General, see Michael Kelly, Settling In:
The President's Day; Clinton Cancels Baird Nomination forJustice Dept., N.Y. Times Jan. 22,
1993, at Al, and Lani Guinier for Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, see Neil A. Lewis,
Clinton Abandons His Nominee for Rights Post Amid Opposition, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1993, at
Al. Even the mere prospect of adverse press has discouraged some from running the Senate
confirmation gauntlet, as evidenced by Bobby Inman's withdrawal from consideration for
Secretary of Defense. See R.W. Apple, Jr., A Nominee's Withdrawal; Inman Withdraws as
Clinton Choice for Defense Chief, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1994, at Al.
205. Heclo, supra note 145, at 98; cf. Robinson, supra note 74, at 107 (criticizing the use
of appointments for political patronage because it interferes with attracting "the right
people"). In extreme cases political pressure from unpopular actions by regulators may force
the President to appoint an official because the official does not share his ideology. For
example, after attacks on Anne Gorsuch's management of the EPA, President Reagan
appointed William Ruckelshaus as Administrator, whose reputation for independence in that
position under President Nixon "vras essential to restoring the administration's credibility on
environmental issues." Philip B. Heymann, The Politics of Public Management 81 (1987). In
such a situation, however, the goal of democratic accountability suggests that the President
should not be able to appoint an official who shares his policy perspective.
206. See Rosen, supra note 48, at 18-20 (arguing that incompetence of appointed officials,
rather than lack of political control of the bureaucracy, often is the barrier to implementation
of the President's agenda).
207. See Lazarus, supra note 32, at 344-46 (describing the effects of Congress's distrust of
the EPA under Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford).

PRESIDENTAL INFLUENCE
When all is said aid done, the big picture approach merely suggests
that proposal of a legislative agenda aimed at a coherent regulatory vision
and appointment of officials who share that vision are methods that
Presidents have not used to the fullest extent to facilitate their influence of
agency policy.208 This approach does not promise, however, that
increased use of these mechanisms alone will maximize agency allegiance
to the President's policies. Nor does the approach limit presidential
influence to these mechanisms. Even under the big picture approach there
may be room for some form of executive regulatory review to monitor and
constrain agency policy-setting. The question remains, however, how to
structure that review to avoid the problems of micromanagement.
B. Evaluation of Executive Order 12,866
The current regulatory review program is governed by Executive
Order 12,866.209 This Order expands the substantive guidelines for
regulation beyond the simplistic maximization of net economic benefits
that President Reagan had commanded. Executive Order 12,866 instead
includes a page-and-a-half "Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and
Principles," which describes a host of factors that agencies should consider
when issuing regulations.210 In its section on OMB review, the Order calls
for the Administrator of OIRA to "provide meaningful guidance and
oversight so that each agency's regulatory actions are consistent with
applicable law, the President's priorities, and the principles set forth in this
Executive order."2 1 Beyond this, the Order also expands the procedural
requirement that agencies file regulatory agendas and annual plans with
OMB to apply to independent regulatory agencies as well as executive
agencies. 212
In most other respects, Executive Order 12,866 constrains the review
prerogatives that OMB enjoyed under the Reagan-Bush program. At the
outset, it restricts OIRA review to significant regulatory actions.2 ' s The

208. See Robinson, supra note 74, at 107; cf. Hess, supra note 73, at 179-81 (contending
that recent Presidents have been slow to take advantage of lessened traditional constraints on
selecting the Cabinet).
209. 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993).
210. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735-36 (1993).
211. Id. § 6(b).
212. Id. § 4(b)-(c). Commentators have debated whether the President has the
constitutional power to apply binding substantive provisions specified as part of OMB review
to independent agencies-agencies whose heads the President cannot remove at will. See
Shane, supra note 7, at 1258-59 & nn.107-08. No President has yet applied such provisions to
independent agencies, perhaps out of fear of a congressional backlash. Accountability and
coherence arguments for presidential influence on agency policy, however, suggest that some
presidential influence on policies of independent agencies is appropriate as long as the
President cannot specify the outcome of any particular decision. In other words, application
of the big picture approach to independent agencies is appropriate, and probably would
engender less congressional hostility than would presidential micromanagement of such
agencies.
213. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b) (1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,742 (1993). Significant regulatory
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order limits access to OIRA by those outside the executive for discussion of
matters under review; it also provides for broad disclosure of OMB
meetings with outsiders and, after the agency publishes a regulatory action,
of OMB's communications with the agency.214 In addition, the Order
strictly limits the time OIRA has to complete its review of an agency
regulatory action. " The Clinton program, however, retains one core
feature that, in the past, OMB has attempted to use to control agency
policy decisions: Executive Order 12,866 still provides that an agency may
not proceed with a regulatory action that OIRA has determined requires
further consideration. 18

1. The Substantive Provisions of Executive Order 12,866 and the Lack of
a Big Picture
The Clinton campaign promised solutions to particular problems
rather than a defined philosophy of government regulation. Clinton
promised to move towards a balanced budget, to stimulate job creation in
the economy, and to provide health insurance reform that would stop
excessive increases in health care costs and provide universal coverage, all
without imposing additional taxes on the middle class.2
Since his
election, President Clinton has continued to pick out particular problems
rather than sketch out a big picture approach. He has, for example, added

crime and the threat it poses to the security of the average American as a
problem he intends to tackle. 8
The lack of a big picture approach is evident in Executive Order
12,866. Its "Statement of Regulatory Philosophy and Principles" purports to

retain the
12,291.210

cost-benefit requirement

of Reagan's Executive

Order

Even that cost-benefit requirement was necessarily fuzzy,

actions are those likely to result in a rule that (1) has an annual effect on the economy of
$100 million or more; (2) creates serious inconsistencies with other agencies' regulations; (3)
materially alter budgetary obligations of existing governmental benefits programs; or (4) raise
novel legal or policy issues. Id. § 3(f). The Clinton Administration has estimated that this will
reduce OIRA's review workload by about one-third. Clinton Signs Regulatory Review Order,
Issues Instructions to Agencies, OIRA, 61 Banking Rep. (BNA) 514, 515 (Oct. 4, 1993).
214. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(4), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,742-43 (1993).
215. Id. § 6(b)(2).
216. Id. § 8. An agency can take a regulatory action without OIRA approval only by
requesting Presidential consideration of the matter. Id. Under Presidents Reagan and Bush,
OMB used the need for agencies to get its approval to gain virtual veto power over proposed
regulations. SePerdval, supra note 2, at 162.
217. See Ronald Brownstein, Competing Plans for Prosperity, L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1992, at
Al; Steven Mufson, Clinton's Economic Strategy; Slump, Deficit Demands Conflict, Wash.
Post, Oct. 11, 1992, at Al; David E. Rosenbaum, The 1992 Campaign: Issues-Unanswered
Questions; Bush, Clinton and Perot Demonstrate How to Let the Worst Go Unspoken, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 27, 1992, atA21.
218. Kenneth J. Cooper, Political Priorities May Shape Crime Bill; House, Senate
Negotiators to Divide Billions Among Police, Prisons and Prevention, Wash. Post, Apr. 25,
1994 at A7; Charles Silberman, Truth and Justice; Why the Best Hope in a 'War" on Crime
May Be a Stalemate, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1994, § 4, at 1.
219. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(6)(6), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,736 (1993)("[Elach
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allowing OMB to disagree with agencies' Regulatory Impact Analyses
(RIAs) because of fundamental differences in how OMB reviewers and
agency staff valued particular costs and benefits.22 The Clinton order
makes the standard even fuzzier, however, by allowing agencies to
promulgate rules based on reasoned determinations that benefits exceed
costs without having to quantify those benefits and costs.2' Executive
Order 12,866 further clouds the standard by requiring that agencies
consider "incentives for innovation, consistency, predictability, the costs of
flexibility, distributive impacts and
enforcement and compliance ....
equity" in designing "the most cost-effective" regulations.2 It also
demands that "each agency.., consider, to the extent reasonable, the
degree and nature of the risks posed by various substances of activities
within its jurisdiction. " 2s Many of these considerations will work in
opposite directions when applied to a particular regulatory decision, and
the agency will have to prioritize them before evaluating any particular
regulation. The Executive Order gives no basis for performing this
prioritization.
The Statement is not objectionable if viewed as a precatory list of
factors that each agency should consider before taking a regulatory action.
Each factor in the Statement is important and an agency would be remiss
if it failed to consider any of them before making its decision. But the
Statement, as it stands, does not greatly limit agency decision-making
discretion because it leaves the agency free to balance these factors as it
sees fit in light of its statutory mandate. In other words, such a broad list of
considerations does little to inform the agency as to what the President
may desire concerning any particular regulation.
The lack of direction provided by the Statement would not be of great
concern were it merely a guideline for agency rulemaking; agencies are
better structured than OMB to make such discretionary decisions, m4 and
the President has other means of influencing agency policy-setting.2 The
Statement poses a much greater problem, however, as a guideline for

agency shall... propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.") with Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 2(b), 3
C.F.R. 128 (1982) ("[R] egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits
to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society.").
220. See Houck, supra note 14, at 541 (claiming OMB was able to use the "least cost"
mandate of Executive Order 12,291 "to reinterpret statutory policies whenever a statute
allow[ed] for agency discretion"); Percival, supra note 2, at 184-89 (arguing that OMB was
able to apply the cost-benefit requirement of Executive Order 12,291 in a manner that biased
it against government regulation).
221. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 1(b)(6), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,736 (1993).

222. Id.§1(b)(5).
223. Id. § I(b)(4).
224. See supra notes 119-138 and accompanying text (discussing problems created by
OIRA's structure and review procedures).
225. See supra notes 149-155 and accompanying text (discussing methods of presidential
influence other than direct review that may comport better with my big picture approach).
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OIRA review of agency policy. Its lack of direction then translates into
authorization for O1RA desk officers and analysts to rebalance all the
factors in the Statement without any direction about the weight to accord
each factor.26

The problem is heightened by Executive Order 12,866's authorization
of OIRA to object to an agency regulatory action on the grounds that it is
inconsistent with unstated priorities of the President. The Order does
contain one provision that may ameliorate this problem: It provides for an
annual planning meeting at which the Vice President, agency heads, and
presidential advisors (including the Administrator of OIRA and the
director of OMB) "seek a common understanding of priorities.., to be
accomplished in the upcoming year."2 The annual meeting, however,
does little to ensure political accountability of the administration's
priorities, and it remains unclear whether any "understanding" reached at
the meeting will provide sufficient direction to OIRA desk officers to
guarantee that their objections to agency regulatory actions comport with
the policy vision of the President. If the Order provides any such
guarantee, it derives from the procedural constraints the Order imposes on
OMB rather than from the use of a substantive big picture to constrain
OMB review.
2. The ProceduralProvisionsof Executive Order 12,866 as a Constraint
on OMB Discretion
The procedural constraints that Executive Order 12,866 imposes on
OIRA are more significant than its substantive constraints. Nonetheless,
these provisions ensure neither that OIRA's influence will conform to the
President's policy preferences nor that such influence will foster
achievement of public-oriented statutory goals rather than private-interest
political deals.
OMB's influence may deviate from the President's priorities because
Executive Order 12,866 still effectively allows OMB to veto agency
regulatory actions. Unlike under the Reagan program, OIRA must respond
to an agency submission within strict time limits; OIRA cannot "pocket
veto" a proposed rule by simply delaying review of it.ns Once OIRA
responds by requesting further consideration of the proposed agency
action, however, the agency may not proceed.
Technically, an agency can seek an override of an OIRA objection by
226. Even the more focused cost-benefit directive of Executive Order 12,291 was
sufficiently imprecise in practice to allow OMB to object to any rule it found politically
objectionable. See Comments of Frank White, Agency Diplomacy. Relations with Congress and
the White House, and Ethics in the Administrative Process, 4 Admin. LJ. 3, 25 (1990)
(describing how OMB used the imprecision of cost-benefit review to force its position on

OSHA).
227. Exec. Order 12,866, § 4(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,738 (1993).
228. See Percival, supra note 2, at 162. But cf Bruff, supra note 74, at 540-41 (noting that
OMB has in fact delayed proposals).
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the agency head requesting a resolution of the conflict from the Vice
President or President.Y But the President and Vice President are too
busy to resolve all but the most severe conflicts between OMB and the
agency. In fact, agency heads and the Director of OMB are probably
sufficiently busy that even they will hesitate to get involved in the
resolution of most conflicts. 23 0 As a result there will be great pressure on
agency and OIRA staff members to work out conflicts among themselves. 21 In proposing a regulation, however, it is the agency staff that
seeks to alter the status quo, and because OIRA staff has the authority to
stop the regulatory action, it can force the agency staff member to seek
higher level review. In other words, because the review process is set up to
allow OIRA presumptively to stop agency action, low-level OIRA reviewers
will retain a significant ability independently to pressure the agency to
change its position. 2 Thus, the procedural constraints merely ensure
that the agency can force the President or his dose advisors to monitor
OMB's changes to agency proposed rules in high profile cases. In most
cases, however, no such monitoring will occur.
The Executive Order's procedural constraints address more directly
the possibility of OMB's special interest bias. The Order limits communications of those outside the executive branch with OIRA staff members:
Once a matter is under review at OIRA an outsider may only "initiate"
such a communication orally to the Administrator of OIRA or in writing.
OIRA must disclose to the public the initiation of any such outside
communication and, once the agency publishes the regulatory action
under review, the substance of such communications.2 3 Also, after the
agency publishes the regulatory action, OIRA must make available to the
public all documents it exchanged with the agency as part of its review. 2
In addition, the agency must identify any changes it made at the

229. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § (8), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,743-44 (1993).
230. Cf. Morrison, supra note 8, at 1073 (noting that the role of OMB Director David
Stockman in rulemaking was "very small").
231. For a description of the negotiation that occurs between OIRA and the agency, along
with an analysis of the advantages held by each, see Bruff, supra note 17, at 559-62.
232. Thus, under Executive Order 12,291, which purported to leave the ultimate
rulemaking decision to the agency but allowed OIRA to prevent the agency from proceeding
until further consideration, "[O]nly agency administrators had the clout to appeal the
decisions of lower-level OIRA personnel, or even to get the agency's telephone calls returned
by OMB officials." Shapiro, supra note 17, at 11. Agency heads had neither the time nor
political capital to intervene repeatedly in OIRA-agency negotiations. Id. Not surprisingly,
under the Reagan regulatory review program, "[lit [was] unlikely that an agency [would] issue
a regulation in the face of OMB disapproval." Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 186.
233. Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b) (4) (B), Fed. Reg. 51,742-43 (1993). Technically, the
substance of oral communications between the Administrator of OIRA and outsiders may
never be reduced to writing and hence never revealed. OIRA must disclose, however, the fact
that the communication took place and the subject discussed. Id. Oral communications
between agency staff and OIRA need not be revealed.
234. Id. § 6(b)(4)(D).
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suggestion of OIRA. 2- In essence, Executive Order 12,866 tries to hold
OIRA accountable by public disclosure of OIRA's communications and
influence on an agency decision.
Although such public disclosure goes a long way toward discouraging
blatant attempts by OIRA to favor unpopular special interest groups,
Executive Order 12,866 still leaves some loopholes for special interest
input. Astute special interest representatives can make their positions
known to OIRA before a pending agency action is formally under OIRA
review. Also, interest group representatives can use contacts in the White
House to channel their input to OIRA. A more fundamental problem with
the Order is that disclosure usually will not prompt sufficient political
reaction to discourage OIRA from advocating special interest positions. As
already noted, it is hard to get the general electorate to react at the polls
to any particular regulatory decision.- 6 Moreover, OERA frequently can
frame an interest group's position in terms of more public-minded goals,
which helps to hide OIRA's true motives. This further increases the costs
of educating and organizing large groups whose members share diffused
interests in opposition to OIRA's actions.
There is yet one additional shortcoming of the procedural constraints
imposed by Executive Order 12,866. The Order retains OIRA's prerogative
to preview agency regulatory actions before they are published. As a result,
OIRA input occurs before the agency engages in any discussion and
exchange with entities who might be affected by the action. This may
discourage the agency from responding open-mindedly to input during its
subsequent rulemaking proceeding and thereby undercut any effect such a
proceeding may have in encouraging the agency to engage in deliberative
decision-making. For example, OIRA gets to review any rule the agency is
considering proposing before the agency publishes notice of the proposed
rule. If OIRA decides the rule warrants further consideration, the proposed
rule may never get published, which precludes any subsequent proceeding
altogether. In such a case communications between OMB and the agency
remain confidential. Even if a proposed rule does get published, it will
already reflect a resolution between OIRA and agency staff that the agency
may be hesitant to upset in response to public comments. As a result,
OIRA's preview of the proposed rule could encourage the agency and
entities filing comments to become intransigent and to assume adversarial
roles, which in turn would interfere with any attempt to structure
regulations to respond to the concerns of all interested parties.5 7
Executive Order 12,866 seems to have envisioned this problem, as it
explicitly requires each agency to encourage involvement of those affected

285. Id. § 6(a) (3) (E) (iii).
236. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
237. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 46, at 1552 (making a similar point about reliance on
challenges to agency statements of policy when they are applied as a means of fostering
deliberation about the wisdom of the policies).
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by regulations prior to publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking, and to
explore consensual mechanisms for developing regulations, such as
negotiated rulemaking.m Unfortunately, negotiated rulemaking, which
relies on prenotice conferences to secure consensual regulation, is not the
norm.239 Moreover, the very decision to convene a negotiated rulemaking
conference is a regulatory action subject to review before the fact by OIRA.
Hence, despite the Order's seeming sensitivity to the potential for agencies
to foster deliberative democratic processes, by giving OIRA a first bite at
the apple it potentially discourages consensual regulatory mechanisms.
3. Some Recommendationsfor Changes to the Current Regulatory Review
Program
Although the Clinton reform of OMB regulatory review has alleviated
much of the concern generated by the Reagan-Bush review program, the
above analysis indicates that such review still poses a threat of OMB
micromanagement of agency policies.2 4 To reduce this threat further
reforms are in order.
The most significant step the Clinton administration could take would
be to amend Executive Order 12,866 to provide some overarching themes
that might help guide OIRA reviewers. This might be difficult because
Clinton did not define such themes as part of his presidential campaign.
Nonetheless, many of the particular programs he advocated share some
common thread that might constitute a coherent regulatory philosophy.
His concern for economic growth and job creation, and his plan for a
national health care system both address the fears of working Americans
about the possibility of losing theirjobs and the effects of such loss. Hence,
one overarching theme could require agencies to design regulations to
minimize disruptions in employment and generally to maintain present
jobs or encourage job growth. This might require, for example, that
agencies make provisions for job retraining or development of alternative
industries when regulations would otherwise discourage the maintenance
of an industry in a particular geographical region.24' If one adds the

238. Exec. Order 12,866, § 6(a)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,740 (1993).
239. As ofJune 30, 1989, only eight agencies had used negotiated rulemaking in a total of
nineteen proposed regulations. S8e Admin. Conference of the United States, Office of the
Chairman 1990, Negotiated Rulemaking Sourcebook 327-43 (1990). The frequency with which
agencies utilize negotiated rulemaking presumably will increase now that Congress has
statutorily authorized this mechanism in the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C.A.
§§ 561-570 (West Supp. 1994).
240. The only other academic analysis of Executive Order 12,866 reached a consistent
conclusion that the extent to which the Order will reduce secrecy at and micromanagement
by OIRA "depend[s] on how the order is implemented." Shapiro, supra note 17, at 36.
241. Prohibitions on logging in old growth forests in the Northwest immediately come to
mind as a regulation that would warrant special efforts to minimize the effects ofjob loss and
employment dislocations. SeeJohn H. Cushman, Jr., Owl Issue Tests Reliance on Consensus in
Environmentalism, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1994, at 28 (discussing difficulties with Clinton
Administration's plans to resolve disputes about managing old growth forests by seeking
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administration's recent concerns about crime, perhaps one could justify a
broader theme requiring agencies to place greater value on the reduction
of economic, health, and safety risks when preparing regulatory impact
analyses. At the very least, Executive Order 12,866 should be modified to
give reviewers some indication of the relative priorities the President places
on the multitude of factors the Order requires an agency to consider.
In addition to the substantive definition of overarching policy themes,
some procedural modifications would also help constrain runaway OMB
review and make the process of presidential influence over agency
rulemaking more meaningfully accountable. First and foremost, Executive
Order 12,866 should be modified to eliminate the effective veto power of
low-level OIRA staff. This could be done by altering the presumptive effect
of a disagreement between the agency and OIRA so that the agency can
continue with a rulemaking despite the objections of OIRA staff. To avoid
eviscerating presidential influence, the President or a designated dose
advisor in the White House should still be allowed to prevent the agency
from proceeding to issue a final rule by personally objecting to the agency
head.
The agency should be required to place in the rulemaking docket any
written communications and a summary of oral communications with
OIRA desk officers and analysts. This requirement would still permit OIRA
and the agency to engage in deliberative informal discussions that are
crucial to effective OIRA input. At the same time, docketing these
communications would allow higher-level managers in OIRA to monitor
low-level staff interaction with agencies to prevent OIRA reviewers from
introducing their idiosyncratic policy perspectives into a rulemaking
process. In addition, placing the substance of OlRA's communications in
the record will allow others to comment on OIRA's concerns, which would
improve the deliberative function of notice and comment proceedings.
The docketing requirement may stifle some discussion by OIRA and
agency staff. But the lower level OIRA staff members to which the
requirement would apply have less overtly political agendas; their opinions
would be more objectively grounded and hence less embarrassing if
publicly disclosed. Therefore, the docketing requirement's chilling effect
on deliberative discussion is not likely to be great. The impact of docketing
communications in reducing the likelihood that low-level staff members
might introduce idiosyncratic concerns into OIRA's influence on
rulemaking outweighs docketing's potential chilling effect on
OIRA/agency communications.242

consensus between environmentalists and the logging industry).
242. Whether docketing of OIRA-agency communications would have a net beneficial
effect Is a difficult question, and various commentators have drawn the lines of required
disclosure for such communications in different places. See, eg., Recommendations of the
Admin. Conference of the United States, 54 Fed. Reg. 5207, 5208 (1989) (same); Bruff supra
note 17, at 588 (calling for docketing of written but not oral communications); Gilhooley,
supra note 92, at 320-21 (calling for identification of portions of rules changed as a result of
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These procedural modifications of the regulatory review mechanism
would ensure that low-level OIRA staff members could not leverage
objections into influence of the agency decision without agreement by the
President or at least a high-level OMB official or White House advisor.
Thus, the President would have less need to monitor OIRA staff
interactions with the agency. Moreover, since interactions of OIRA desk
officers and analysts with the agency would be public, interest groups
involved in the proceeding could monitor these interactions for the
President and sound an alarm if OIRA's input appeared unacceptable.243
Finally, if the President's decision to halt agency action were permitted
only after comments to a proposed rule were already filed, the President
and the agency would have the benefit of the public deliberation that
would occur during the notice and comment proceeding. So structured,
executive regulatory review would not directly undercut the use of the
agency proceeding to formulate policy that furthers the general public's
interest.
CONCLUSION

The past two decades have seen a raging debate about the proper
extent of presidential influence over agency policy-setting. The controversy
was fueled during the Reagan and Bush administrations by competition
between the Democratic Congress and Republican Presidents for control of
the federal bureaucracy. President Clinton's continued reliance on a
program of substantive executive review of agency rulemaking, despite
Democratic control of Congress, suggests that the debate will continue
regardless of whether one party controls both Capitol Hill and the White
House.
Rather than directly enter the fray in this debate over the appropriate
extent of presidential influence, this Article has focused instead on the
question of how the President should go about influencing agency policymaking. It has analyzed this question along the dimension of
micromanagement versus macromanagement of agency policy. As the
normative measures for this evaluation, the Article investigated the extent
to which each approach would, first, help the President implement his
policy choices and, second, discourage policies geared towards appeasing
special interests at the expense of the public good.
Using this framework for evaluation, this Article concludes that the

OIRA agency negotiation); NAPA Report, supra note 95, at 35 (recommending disclosure of

oral communications).
243. This is an example of what political scientists have termed "fire alarm" rather than
"police patrol" oversight. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 165, 166 (1984).
Generally, fire alarms are cheaper for the political "principal" (i.e. Congress or the President)
to administer, although they may increase the principals' costs of monitoring agencies. See
Arthur Lupia & Matthew D. McCubbins, Learning from Oversight. Fire Alarms and Police
Patrols Reconstructed, 10J.L. Econ. & Org. 96, 111 (1994).
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President should avoid micro-managing agency policy decisions. Instead,
he should adopt a big picture approach to influencing agency policy-attempting to inculcate in administrative agencies an overarching
policy vision that will guide them toward outcomes consistent with his
policy preferences. By doing so, the President minimizes the costs of
monitoring the ultimate policy maker, whether it be the agency head or
the Office of Management and Budget staff. At the same time, the big
picture approach encourages a deliberative policy-making process that
better furthers the public interest. Only in this manner can the President
retain control over the federal bureaucracy in a manner that ensures that
regulatory policy is consistent with the values of the American electorate.

